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ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF STATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM

INFRINGEMENT OF FEDERAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
PeterS. Menell*
The federal intellectual property system serves as a principal
means of promoting "progress in Science and useful Arts"1 through
the provision of limited monopolies to authors and inventors. By this
logic, enhancing the scope or enforceability of intellectual property
rights increases the expected reward to those engaged in intellectual
work, thereby spurring intellectual creativity and the exploitation of
works. Inversely, impediments to the enforcement of the intellectual
property rights or limitations on remedies reduce this reward stream
and opportunity for exploitation, thereby dampening the incentives
of those who engage in creative enterprise.
During the 1980s, intellectual property owners became concerned that a significant class of consumers of intellectual propertythe fifty states and their myriad agencies and institutions, including
public universities-might escape or at least frustrate enforcement of
federal intellectual property rights by invoking state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.2 In
* Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley, and Director,
Berkeley Center for Law and Technology. I am grateful to Fred Abbot, Thomas Cotter, John Dwyer, Lauren Edelman, Willy Fletcher, Paul Heald, Justin
Hughes, Dan Meltzer, Rob Merges, Jennifer Poise, Marty Simpson, Simon
Steel, Claire Sylvia, Eugene Volokh, and John Yoo for helpful discussions and
to Pratik Shah for research assistance.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend XI. The Supreme Court has interpreted
this Amendment as prohibiting all suits by individuals against nonconsenting
states in federal court, not only Article III diversity actions. See Hans v. Lou-
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1985, the Supreme Court held that Congress must "mak[e] its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute" to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity. 3 Three years later, the Federal Circuit affirmed a decision dismissing a patent infringement action
brought against the State of California on the grounds that California
had not consented to jurisdiction and the Patent Act did not contain
an unmistakably clear statement that Congress intended to abrogate
state sovereign immunity. 4 In response, Congress enacted a series of5
laws expressly abrogating state sovereign immunity for copyright,
trademark,6 and patent infringement. In 1996, the Supreme Court in
Seminole Tribe v. Florida8 raised the bar another notch in holding
that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity when legislating pursuant to its Article I powers. The Court noted, 9 however,
that Congress retains authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity
pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment remedial powers to "enforce,
isiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13, 15 (1890). See generally Patent Remedy Clarification
Act: Hearing on H.R. 3886 before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Hearings before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights
and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual
Property, and the Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); A Report of the Register of Copyrights, Copyright Liability of States and the Eleventh Amendment (June 1988).
3. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
4. See Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (upholding the
dismissal of a patent infringement claim against a state on the ground that the
Patent Act did not contain a clear statement that Congress intended to subject
states to infingement liability); see also Lane v. First Nat'l Bank, 871 F.2d
166 (1st Cir. 1989) (dismissing copyright action against state entity on sovereign immunity grounds); BV Eng'g v. UCLA, 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988)
(same); Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir.
1988) (same).
5. Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat.
2749 (1990) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 511 (1994)).
6. Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat.
3567 (1992) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1122, 1125(a), 1127 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998)).
7. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L.
No. 102-560, § 2(a)(2), 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 296
(1994)).
8. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
9. See id. at 71 n.15.
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by appropriate legislation,"' 10 that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any
i
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."' I
At the close of its 1998 Term, the Supreme Court, in Florida
PrepaidPostsecondaryEducation Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank,12 struck down the Patent and Plant Variety Remedy Clarification Act on the grounds that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity on the basis of Article I powers and that Congress had
not established an adequate basis for abrogation of state sovereign
immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. In the Supreme
Court's view, the legislative record on which Congress based the
Patent Remedy Clarification Act established neither a "pattern of
patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional
violations," nor the lack of adequate state remedies sufficient to justify remedial measures for violations of due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 13 In a companion case, College Savings
14
Bank v. FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEducation Expense Board,
the Supreme Court struck down aspects of the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act relating to false advertising claims on the ground
that such violations do not intrude upon a constitutionally recognized
"property right" and therefore Congress lacked power under the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity with
regard to such claims. As a result, the Court never reached the decisive question in FloridaPrepaid of whether the abrogation of state
sovereign immunity was necessary to prevent violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 15 The Fifth Circuit has now completed the trilogy, striking down the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act as

10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
11. Id. § 1.
12. 119 S.Ct. 2199 (1999).
13. Id. at 2207-10.
14. 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
15. In College Savings Bank, the Supreme Court also rejected the argument
that the State of Florida had voluntarily waived its sovereign immunity by engaging in "otherwise lawful activity" such as interstate commerce, overruling
its decision in Pardenv. TerminalRailway ofAlabama Docks Department,377
U.S. 184 (1964). College Savings Bank, 119 S.Ct. at 2228-31. The Court
confirmed, however, that Congress may compel a waiver of sovereign immunity where a state receives a "gift or gratuity" or "federal beneficence" that
Congress may rightfully withhold. Id. at 2231.
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beyond congressional power as delimited by the Supreme Court's
FloridaPrepaiddecisions.16
In relying upon its prior ruling in Seminole Tribe that Congress
may not abrogate state sovereign immunity under its Article I powers, and by narrowly interpreting Congress's remedial powers under
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court largely sidestepped
the broader implications of its decision for federal intellectual property policy. This Article examines the effects of the constitutional
constraints on federal abrogation of state sovereign immunity upon
the incentives of inventors and creators of expressive works as well
as the intellectual property system in general. 17 The Article looks in
turn at the likely effects on state infringement of intellectual property
rights in the United States, the viability of alternative means of protecting federal intellectual property rights, and potential implications
of the decisions for international intellectual property diplomacy. It
concludes that although state sovereign immunity for violations of
federal intellectual property rights is unlikely to significantly undermine the rights of intellectual property owners because of a broad array of legal, market, social, and political restraints upon states and
state actors, state sovereign immunity could undermine international
treaty obligations and foreign diplomacy. These latter concerns
16. See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 608 (5th Cir. 2000)
(affirming district court decision to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on FloridaPrepaid);see also Rodriguez v. Texas Comm'n on the
Arts, 199 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2000) (same). But cf. Peter Bray, After College

Savings v. Florida Prepaid, Are States Subject to Suit for Copyright Infringement? The Copyright Remedy ClarificationAct and Chavez v. Arte Publico
Press, 36 Hous. L. REV. 1531 (1999) (arguing that the legislative basis for abrogating state sovereign immunity for copyright infringement may be more
justifiable under the Supreme Court's Fourteenth Amendment standard on the
ground that the legislative record on which the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act was based contained significant substantiation of pervasive and intentional copyright infringement by state entities).
17. The Supreme Court's rulings do not wholly divorce sovereign immunity from concerns about the integrity of the federal intellectual property system. The Court left open the possibility that Congress could, upon a greater
showing of pervasive intellectual property infringement by states and the lack
of adequate state remedies, abrogate state sovereign immunity to remedy violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at
2209-10. The effect of the decisions is to impose upon Congress a relatively
high burden of proof.
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potentially provide an alternative basis for congressional abrogation
of state sovereign immunity for infringement of federal intellectual
property rights.
1.

INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS UPON STATE INFRINGEMENT OF
FEDERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

At first blush, the Supreme Court's Florida Prepaiddecisions
appear to afford states and state entities some enticing options for reducing the costs of providing services to their constituents. State offices could free up resources by purchasing just one copy of computer programs and making copies for all of their employees. Public
schools could ease budgetary pressures while raising teacher salaries
and expanding programs by setting up government-operated printing
operations to reproduce textbooks for all students in the state. State
universities could reduce their costs of operating laboratories and
other research facilities by using patented products and processes in
their laboratories without paying royalties. State hospitals could significantly reduce the costs of providing care by manufacturing patented drugs.
While these opportunities have obvious appeal, especially to
state governments and institutions seeking to keep taxes and tuition
low and services high, it is unlikely that states will change their policies regarding compliance with federal intellectual property laws
following the Florida Prepaid decisions. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's expansive view of state sovereign immunity and the
constitutional limitations upon Congress's ability to abrogate such
immunity, legal, market, social, and political constraints will likely
dissuade states from either adopting policies to infringe federal intellectual property rights or allowing state entities to engage in widespread 8or systematic infringement of federal intellectual property
rights.1

18. See generally JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW
AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1998) (laying

out a general multi-institutional framework for understanding governance of
resources).
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A. Legal Constraintson Infringement ofIntellectualPropertyRights
by States
The Supreme Court's Florida Prepaid decisions do not foreclose intellectual property owners from seeking legal recourse for infringement of their intellectual property rights by states and state officials, although full enforcement of federal intellectual property
rights will undoubtedly be more costly, time-consuming, and complicated. Intellectual property owners may still obtain injunctive relief against state actors in federal court to prevent violations of their
rights. Although they cannot directly obtain damages for infringement from states, they may nonetheless be able to obtain comparable
relief through actions against state officials in their individual capacity and through inverse condemnation actions under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Furthermore, they can seek recourse within the state
court system under various theories. The availability and nature of
relief, however, will depend upon additional circumstances beyond
those involved in traditional intellectual property enforcement actions.
1. Federal causes of action
Intellectual property owners may still bring federal actions
against municipalities and state and municipal employees in their individual capacity. Under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 19 owners
may still be able to obtain injunctive relief against state officials who
infringe federal intellectual property rights. The Eleventh Amendment bars intellectual property owners from obtaining direct retrospective monetary relief from states in federal court, but comparable
relief may be available through actions pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment for inverse condemnation of federal intellectual property rights. In addition, intellectual property owners might be able to
obtain attorney fees in federal actions by asserting § 1983 claims.
a. federal intellectualproperty claims
In understanding the effect of the FloridaPrepaiddecisions, it
is important to distinguish among the range of public bodies and employees within the states for purposes of applying Eleventh
19. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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Amendment sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court has long held
that municipalities, while public, are not state entities within the
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. 20 Therefore, intellectual property owners may sue municipalities and municipal workers in state
court without regard to the FloridaPrepaid decisions. Thus, many
public entities within the states-including cities, school boards,
public utilities, regional transportation authorities, county hospitals,
and some community colleges-remain subject to suit in federal
court for violations of the intellectual property laws.
Following the Florida Prepaid decisions, there may be more
disputes as to whether a hybrid entity "is to be treated as an arm of
the State partaking of the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity, or
instead to be treated as a municipal corporation or other political
subdivision to which the Eleventh Amendment does not extend.'
In making this determination, courts examine a range of factors including how the entity is treated under state law, the entity's sources
of funding, the nature of the governmental function performed,
and
22
the extent to which the entity is subject to state control.
If a state entity infringes federal intellectual property rights, the
intellectual property owner may nevertheless bring an enforcement
action in federal court to enjoin such infringement by the state entity
or official. The key in doing so is to lodge the action against the responsible state official in his or her official capacity. In Ex parte
Young, the Supreme Court held that "'a suit against individuals for
the purpose of preventing them as officers of a State from enforcing
an unconstitutional enactment to the injury of the rights of the plaintiff, is not a suit against the State within the meaning of [the Eleventh] Amendment."'' 23 The doctrine of Ex parte Young applies to
20. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 56 n.20 (1990) (holding that
school boards are not protected by the Eleventh Amendment); Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978); Lincoln County v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890). The District of Columbia is treated as a
municipality. See Dorman v. District of Columbia, 888 F.2d 159, 162 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
21. Mount Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280
(1977).
22. See generally MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION
1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES 180-87 (3d ed. 1997) (summarizing

cases applying this analysis).
23. 209 U.S. at 154 (quoting Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 518-19 (1898)).
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some state violations of federal law, whether or not the state violates
constitutional rights.24
The Exparte Young doctrine, however, is subject to a number of
limitations. A plaintiff must normally exhaust state "legislative" and
"administrative" remedies before seeking relief in federal court, 25
26
although the plaintiff need not exhaust state "judicial" remedies.
Furthermore, the Ex parte Young doctrine does not extend to retrospective financial liability.27 Therefore, intellectual property owners
cannot obtain monetary relief directly from the state.28 In addition,
states may use the power of eminent domain to effectuate a taking of
intellectual property rights.29 In such a case, the intellectual property
owner will not be able to obtain injunctive relief, but would be entitled to "just compensation." Such compensation could, however, be
less than what the intellectual property owner would be entitled to in
a traditional infringement action. 30 In addition, the Supreme Court
ruled that injunctive relief under the Ex parte Young doctrine is not
available to enforce federal statutes that contain comprehensive enforcement mechanisms inconsistent with an injunctive remedy in
federal court. 3 1 This narrowing of the Ex parte Young doctrine
See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 7.5.1 (3d ed.
1999) (discussing Ex parte Young doctrine).
24. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985); CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 23, § 7.5.1, at 413, § 7.5.2, at 429.
25. See Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159, 208-09
(1929).
26. See City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Schnader, 291 U.S. 24 (1934). See
generally CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 312-13 (5th ed.
1994) (discussing exhaustion of state remedies).
27. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
28. Damages can be sought from the state officer in his or her individual
capacity for past harms, regardless of whether the state has an indemnification
policy. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); Foulks v. Ohio
Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction, 713 F.2d 1229, 1233 (6th Cir. 1983).
29. Cf Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). The Court in
Ruckelshaus commented that injunctive relief "is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for public use, duly authorized by law, when a
suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign subsequent to the
taking." Id. at 1016. The intellectual property owner would have to pursue an
inverse condemnation claim. In any case, however, the intellectual property
owner would have some recourse.
30. See infra Part I.A.2.a.
31. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996). See generally
Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and Sovereign Immunity, 1996 Sup.
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should not prevent intellectual property owners from pursuing injunctive relief against states to prevent infringement of their rights.
It can be argued that Congress clearly intended that such relief
should be available against states. Furthermore, Congress can clarify
this intent through new legislation.
The FloridaPrepaiddecisions will have their most significant
effect with regard to efforts by intellectual property owners to obtain
monetary relief for past infringement by state entities in actions
brought pursuant to the federal intellectual property statutes. Nonetheless, intellectual property owners may be able to proceed directly
against state officials in their individual capacity. 32 Federal copyright, patent, and trademark law expressly authorize lawsuits against
"any person" who violates these respective regimes. The Florida
Prepaid decisions do not appear to prevent intellectual property
owners from proceeding directly against state officials and employees in their individual capacities for violating federal intellectual
property rights.
For example, if the office manager of a state agency copies and
distributes copyrighted word-processing software among all of the
employees in his division, then the intellectual property owner could
sue the office manager directly for infringement remedies, including
monetary damages. The principal difference between this lawsuit
and a lawsuit against an office manager for a private company who
engages in the same conduct is that the state employee could try to
invoke qualified immunity.
Public employees "generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known." 33 While some
copying of copyrighted material might fall within the scope of this
34
immunity, such as copying for research or educational purposes,
CT. REv., 1, 36-48.

32. See, e.g., Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114, 122

(4th Cir. 1988) (holding that a state actor could be sued in her individual capacity for past damages under the Copyright Act).
33. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). See Lane v. First National Bank, 687 F. Supp. 11, 15-17 (D. Mass. 1988) (considering claim of
qualified immunity in an infringement action against state employee's in their
individual capacities).
34. These activities might be justified under the fair use exception to the
Copyright Act. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
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outright reproduction of entire software programs would likely be
outside of qualified immunity. Furthermore, the intellectual property
owner can diminish the scope of this immunity by sending a cease
and desist demand that puts the alleged infringer on notice of the
rights infringed.
More significantly, in the only appellate case to have considered
qualified immunity of state employees for infringement of federal
intellectual property rights, the Fourth Circuit found the defense inapplicable. In RichardAnderson Photographyv. Brown,35 a photographer sued a state university, its governing board, and its public relations director for infringing his copyrighted photographs. While
dismissing the actions against the state university and its employees
in their official capacity under the Eleventh Amendment, the Fourth
Circuit allowed the suit against the public relations director in her individual capacity to go forward. The court rejected a qualified immunity defense on the ground that the Supremacy Clause precludes
states from diminishing the scope of protection for works protected
by federal copyright law and therefore overrides any state authorized
immunity afforded to state employees. 36 This reasoning has been
adopted in the only subsequently reported case addressing qualified
employee infringement of federal intellectual
immunity for state
37
rights.
property
The fact that state governments require or authorize indemnification of state employees for some forms of liability attributable to
accidents and other exposures arising from conduct within the course
and scope of their employment 38 does not bring such awards within
the scope of the Eleventh Amendment. Even though such indemnification is paid out of state funds, the Supreme Court39does not view
such payments as violating the Eleventh Amendment.

(multifactor test).
35. 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989).
36. See id. at 122-23.
37. See Kersavage v. University of Tenn., 731 F. Supp. 1327, 1330-32

(E.D. Tenn. 1989).
38. See generally 1 JON L. CRAIG, CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND
§ 3.20, at 248-53 (2d ed. 1992) (collecting indemnifica-

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

tion provisions of 36 states).
39. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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It is also possible that private actors will be able to obtain declaratory relief in federal court against states threatening to enforce
state-owned intellectual property rights. Federal law allows a person
to seek declaratory relief in federal court regarding the validity or enforceability of a U.S. patent if the patent owner had caused a reasonable apprehension that an infringement claim will be lodged against
that person and that person has a sufficient interest at stake with regard to the patent.4 0 Thus, a company that receives a cease and desist letter from a patent owner threatening an infringement action
against the company may seek a declaratory judgment that the patent
in question is either invalid or not infringed by the company's activities. 41 The ability to bring such declaratory judgment actions can be
of significant importance in exercising rights in the marketplace and
pursuing a business strategy. For example, the cloud of infringement
liability can greatly undermine a company's ability to raise money or
introduce new products in the marketplace.
The Supreme Court's FloridaPrepaiddecisions do not directly
address whether states can be sued in federal court for declaratory
relief. College Savings Bank confirms, however, that Congress may
compel a waiver of sovereign immunity where a state receives a "gift
or gratuity" or "federal beneficence" that Congress may rightfully
withhold.42 One district court has interpreted this language as supporting declaratory judgment
actions for patent invalidity against
43
court.
states in federal
It is not clear whether the Supreme Court views patents as falling within the categories of gifts, gratuities, or beneficence for
which Congress may compel waiver. On the day following the issuance of the Florida Prepaid decisions, the Supreme Court vacated
and remanded for reconsideration in light of College Savings Bank a
decision by the Federal Circuit holding that the University of California had consented to declaratory judgment actions by obtaining
40. See Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994).
41. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 888 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
42. College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219,2231 (1999).
43. See New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp.
2d 1240, 1243-45 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (rejecting Regents' motion to dismiss declaratory judgment action on grounds of sovereign immunity).
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patents-that by their nature can be adjudicated only in federal
court-and threatening enforcement actions in federal court. 44 The
basis for federal jurisdiction to hear declaratory judgment actions
against states is strong. The Eleventh Amendment should not provide states preferential treatment in exercising rights under federal
intellectual property law.
b. inverse condemnation claims
Even though the Eleventh Amendment shields states from direct
liability for infringement of federal intellectual property rights, intellectual property owners may nonetheless obtain "just compensation" for the taking of their property under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.45 Because of the availability of direct infringement
actions against states prior to the FloridaPrepaiddecisions (and the
paucity of reported incidents of infringements by states), no court has
yet applied takings analysis directly to state infringement of intellectual property rights.46 The law is clear, however, that the Takings
Clause applies to intangible as well as tangible forms of property.
44. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Genentech, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999)
(remanding Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d 1446,
1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
45. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1994); Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (applying the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment).
46. This issue has not arisen with regard to federal government infringement of patents and copyrights because Congress has, since 1910, authorized
intellectual property owners to sue the federal government to recover for use of
intellectual property. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498. This section has been interpreted
as a form of eminent domain, see Irving Air Chute Co. v. United States, 93 F.
Supp. 633, 635 (Ct. Cl. 1950), under which the federal government may condemn a license for the shorter of the period of infringing use or the life of the
intellectual property right. See Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765,
768 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1114 (Ct. Cl.
1977). Courts interpret this provision as equating infringement with "an eminent domain taking." Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 346 (Ct.
Cl. 1977). The federal government formally waived its immunity from Lanham Act infringement in 1999, see Pub. L. No. 106-43, § 4, 113 Stat. 218
(Aug. 5, 1999), although courts had previously held that the Federal Torts
Claims Act waived such immunity for trademark infringement. See generally
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 25:63, at 25-124 (1999).
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The Supreme Court held, more than 150 years ago, that Vermont
could validly take a franchise to a toll bridge crossing and convert it
into a free public road upon payment of compensation to the owner
of the franchise. 47 More recently, the Supreme Court has held that
interest on a bank account constitutes property under the Takings
Clause.4 8 The Supreme Court has recognized that patents, 49 trade secrets, 50 and trademarks 51 constitute property within the meaning of
the Takings Clause, emphasizing the right to exclude as the "hallmark of a protected property interest. ,,52 This same reasoning would
bring copyrights within the class of property rights protected by the

47. See West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507 (6 How.) (1848).
48. See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
49. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 415 (1945)
("That a patent is property, protected against appropriation both by individuals
and by government, has long been settled." (footnote omitted)); James v.
Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1881) (analogizing a utility patent to a land
patent for takings analysis).
50. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
51. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) ("The right to adopt and
use a symbol... to the exclusion of use by all other persons ... is a property
right for the violation of which damages may be recovered in an action at
law.") In College Savings Bank v. FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEducation
Expense Board,Justice Scalia commented that:
The Lanham Act may well contain provisions that protect constitutionally cognizable property interests-notably, its provisions dealing
with infringement of trademarks, which are the "property" of the
owner because he can exclude others from using them. See, e.g., K
mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 185-86, 108 S.Ct. 950, 99 L.
Ed. 2d 151 (1988) ("Trademark law, like contract law, confers private
rights, which are themselves rights of exclusion. It grants the trademark owner a bundle of such rights").
119 S.Ct. at 2224. He went on to note that the Lanham Act's rights against
false advertising are not rights to exclude and therefore do not constitute property rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 2224-25.
52. Id. at 2224. See generally Christina Bohannan & Thomas F. Cotter,
When the State Steals Ideas: Is the Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity
from FederalInfringement Claims Constitutionalin Light of Seminole Tribe?,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1480-81 (1999); Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal
Uses of IntellectualPropertyImplicate the Fifth Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REV.
529 (1998); Paul J. Heald & Michael L. Wells, Remedies for the Misappropriation of IntellectualProperty by State and Municipal Governments Before
and After Seminal Tribe: The Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity Doctrines, 55 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 849, 857-64 (1998).
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Takings Clause.5 3 Therefore, there is a reasonable basis for asserting
that state infringement of intellectual property rights would constitute
a compensable taking.
Intellectual property owners will, however, encounter substantial hurdles in pursuing takings claims against states in federal court.
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank,5 4 the Supreme Court held that a takings claim brought in federal court against a local planning authority would not be ripe for
federal adjudication until the property owner had obtained a final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance to his prop55
Property and had sought compensation through state procedures.

erty owners may, however, pursue a facial challenge to the
56
constitutionality of state action without exhausting state remedies.
Since the infringement of intellectual property rights by a state will
generally not be accomplished through a state statute and in any case
will generally turn on factual questions, this exception to the Williamson ripeness rule will rarely if ever apply in this context.
The resolution of the takings claim at the state level may have
the practical effect of barring the federal proceeding under principles
of res judicata (claim preclusion), collateral estoppel (issue preclusion), and affording full faith and credit to decisions of competent
courts.5 7 Intellectual property owners will get their day in court to
53. See Bohannan & Cotter, supra note 52, at 1480-81 (noting that "the tra-

ditional view of property likely encompasses rights against patent, copyright,
and trademark infringement").
54. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
55. See id. at 186. Some courts have held that a federal takings suit is not
ripe until the claimant has exhausted state appellate review as well. See, e.g.,
Belvedere Military Corp. v. County of Palm Beach, 845 F. Supp. 877, 878

(S.D. Fla. 1994).
The Supreme Court's 1997 decision in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 733-34, however, suggests that the Williamson
ripeness requirement is only prudential. If this dictum does bring Williamson
outside of Article III, then Congress could presumably eliminate such a requirement. See Bohannan & Cotter, supranote 52, at 1470-71 n.217.

56. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992).
57. See Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 142 F.3d
1319, 1319, 1325 n.4 (10th Cir. 1998) (expressing "concern that Williamson's
ripeness requirement may, in actuality, almost always result in preclusion of
federal claims"); see also 144 CONG. REc. S8,024 (1998) (citing study by law

firm of Linowes and Blocker L.L.P., Silver Spring, Md., finding that federal
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pursue takings or inverse condemnation claims against states, but it
will not likely be in a federal district court. Decisions of a state's
highest court reviewing a takings claims would, however, be appealable to the U.S. Supreme Court. As a result of these ripeness and
preclusion doctrines, intellectual property owners will need to navigate state administrative and judicial processes in order to obtain
damages (or "just compensation") for infringement of federal intellectual property rights directly from states.
2. State causes of action
In addition to these bases for federal jurisdiction, intellectual
property owners whose rights are violated by states or state actors
may potentially pursue a variety of remedies in state courts and
through state administrative processes where states have authorized
suits or other remedies. These avenues of recourse are generally inferior to federal relief under the intellectual property statutes and
hence there was little incentive for intellectual property owners to
pursue these remedies for state infringement of federal intellectual
property rights prior to the FloridaPrepaid decisions. The closing
of the federal courthouses to traditional infringement actions directly
against states will undoubtedly encourage intellectual property owners to pursue creative, and in some circumstances largely untested,
approaches to enforcement of intellectual property rights against
states and state actors in state courts and administrative tribunals.
Unlike federal remedies, however, these modes of legal recourse
vary across jurisdictions. This was one of the principal motivations
58
and justifications for enacting the federal remedy clarification acts.
district courts dismissed more than 80% of takings claims on ripeness grounds
between 1990 and 1997); JAN G. LAITOS, LAW OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
PROTECTION: LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENTAL POWERS §

10.05[A] (1999 &

Supp. 2000); G. Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Takings Clause: A
Survey of Decisions Showing Just How FarFederal Courts Will Go to Avoid
AdjudicatingLand Use Cases, 10 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 91, 91 n.3 (1994)
(reporting that only 5.6% of land-use cases filed in federal court between 1983
and 1988 were ripe); Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in
the FederalCourts, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1,92-97 (1995). Such preclusion might
not apply in some circumstances.
JUDGEMENTS §§ 26, 28.

See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

58. See Patent Remedy ClarificationAct: Hearingon H.R. 3886 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of Justice of the
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a. inverse condemnation claims
Intellectual property owners can invoke state inverse condemnation procedures in order to pursue compensation for the infringement of their intellectual property rights by the state. All states afford protection against governmental takings of private property
without due process or compensation through their own laws. The
constitutions of most states have analogs to the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause, 5 9 and many states have enacted specific statutes set60
ting forth procedures for pursuing inverse condemnation actions.
Since the actual appropriation of Froperty for public use is considered an act of eminent domain, an intellectual property owner
would be able to claim that infringement of their intellectual property
rights by the state triggers an obligation to provide compensation.
As noted by the Supreme Court in FloridaPrepaid,62 the Florida Supreme Court has ruled that intellectual property owners may pursue
an inverse condemnation 63action where the state infringes federal intellectual property rights.
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 34, 41 (1990) (testimony of Professor Robert P. Merges) (noting that variation among state law procedures and
remedies could discourage enforcement of rights and undermine a nationally
uniform system of intellectual property rights).
59. See 1 JULIUS SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.3 (rev. 3d
ed. 1998) (noting that North Carolina is the only state lacking such a provision).
60. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 11-972 (West 2000); CAL. CIV.

PROC. CODE §§ 1250.110, 1268.350 (West 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-56116 (West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-17b (West 2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 95, § 9504 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 113-4 (1999); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 40A-51 (1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 20.085 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.

19, § 512 (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-187 (Michie 1999); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 1-26-516 (Michie 2000). Some states offer a separate administrative
remedy for recovering from the state.
61. See 1 SACKMAN, supra note 56, § 1.42[1].
62. See 119 S.Ct. at 2209 n.9.
63. See Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Department of Transp., 626 So. 2d 1333,
1336 (Fla. 1993); see also Wilcox Indus., Inc. v. State, 607 N.E.2d 514, 515
(Ohio 1992) (concluding that patent rights are property rights that may be protected in inverse condemnation action); cf Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida
Dep't of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 728 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (commenting that
"[w]hat a patentee may arguably 'lose' through being limited to a 'takings'
claim or similar state court proceeding is not the ability to obtain any remedy,
but the benefit of provisions in the patent statute relating to remedy, for example, the provisions of 35 U.S.C. §§ 284 and 285 (1988) relating to enhanced
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In order to recover in an inverse condemnation action, a claimant must typically show (1) ownership of a property right; (2) that the
defendant substantially participated in some activity for public use or
benefit; (3) that the property right was taken or damaged, thereby
suffering loss or diminution in value; and (4) that the government's
activity
was the proximate or substantial cause of the taking or dam64
age.
The ownership element parallels requirements of federal intellectual property law. The second element could present a problem in
some circumstances. In California, for example, injury must result
from a deliberate act for the purpose of fulfilling a public objective.
Negligent acts committed during the routine operation of the public
entity do not give rise to a claim. 65 This could be a problem in some
areas of federal intellectual property law, such as the fair use doctrine,6 6 where the line demarcating infringement is notably vague.
Nevertheless, in view of the constitutional basis of inverse condemnation, the claimant does not have to prove that the defendant had
statutory authority to exercise the power of eminent domain. 67 There
are, however, some federal cases suggesting that a takings claimant
must prove that the state actor's conduct resulting in the deprivation
of private property was "duly authorized by law," 68 although the degree of such authorization has not been clearly established in the case
law. 69
There could also be difficulty in applying the third element:
determining whether property has been taken. 70 In the case of
damages and attorney fees").
64. See, e.g., Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d
129, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965); 2 NORMAN E. MATTEONI, CONDEMNATION
PRACTICE INCALIFORNIA § 13.3 (1998).

65. See Bauer v. County of Ventura, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955).
66. See 17 U.S.C. § 104 (1994).
67. "All that is necessary to show is that the damage resulted from an exercise of governmental power while seeking to promote 'the general interest in
its relation to any legitimate object of government'." Baker v. BurbankGlendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 39 Cal. 3d 862, 867, 705 P.2d 866, 868, 218
Cal. Rptr. 293, 295 (1985).
68. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) (footnote
omitted).
69. See Bohannan & Cotter, supra note 52, at 1475-77.
70. Cf Cotter, supra note 52, at 529.
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tangible property, only one person can enjoy exclusive use of real
estate or a tangible asset at any given time. Intellectual property, by
contrast, can be enjoyed by many simultaneously, an attribute referred to as nonrivalrous consumption. For example, many automobile manufacturers can make use of the knowledge necessary to
make intermittent windshield wipers. Therefore, the government's
use of the intellectual property does not technically prevent others
from making use of the same ideas or information. The better view
would be that infringement of intellectual property constitutes a taking because it deprives the owner of the intellectual property of a return stream. 71 Without this ability to appropriate a reward for investment and creativity, there would be little incentive to pursue
costly, difficult, and often valuable forms of innovation.
The measure of damages in an inverse condemnation action is
generally the fair market value of the property taken. 72 The date of
valuation is generally the date the taking or injury occurred. A property owner who prevails may also recover prejudgment interest from
the date of the taking or damage. A prevailing plaintiff is also entitled to attorney fees and reimbursement of costs. 7 3 While some of
these remedies are more generous than federal causes of action,
which, for example, do not provide for attorney fees except in extraordinary circumstances, 74 the compensation award will likely fall
below the damages available under the federal intellectual property
statutes.75 The compensation will, however, approximate that
71. The Supreme Court's references to intellectual property rights as falling
within the ambit of the Takings Clause definition of property rights supports
this view. See Heald & Wells, supranote 52, at 857-64; supra notes 47-58 and

accompanying text.
72. See 2 MATTEONI, supra note 61, § 13.6.
73. See id. § 17.10-.11.
74. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (affording district courts discretion to award costs
and attorney's fees in copyright actions); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994) (authorizing
district courts resolving patent cases to award attorney's fees to the prevailing
party in "exceptional cases"); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994)
(rejecting automatic award of attorney's fees to prevailing party in copyright
actions).
75. Damages under federal patent law "shall be adequate to compensate for
the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use
made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed
by the court .... [T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the
amount found or assessed." 35 U.S.C. § 284. Copyright law provides for
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available to intellectual property76 owners for infringement of their
rights by the federal government.
If an intellectual property owner cannot recover for infringement
of their federal intellectual property rights through a state inverse
condemnation action, then he or she should be able to bring an action
for violation of their federal constitutional rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments because the state would not have provided
an adequate remedy for the taking of the intellectual property
owner's property.
b. tort claims
In addition to inverse condemnation claims, intellectual property
owners may be able to protect their rights and obtain compensation
by pursuing a variety of tort claims against the state, state agencies,
and state actors. In appropriate circumstances, an intellectual property owner may be able to cast aspects of the injurious state conduct
under tort causes of action such as conversion, unjust enrichment,
misappropriation, unfair competition, deceit, and misrepresentation.77 In order to prevail, however, the claimant would need to
overcome sovereign immunity, preemption, and substantive law hurdles.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity shields states from lawsuits
in their own courts without their consent. 78 Furthermore, states may
not be held liable in their own courts for torts committed by their officers, agents, or employees unless they have waived their immunity.7 9 The basis for this doctrine-that the sovereign could not be
sued-originated in the context of monarchical, religious rule where
"the King could do no wrong." This historical basis has gradually
given way in democratic societies to a more utilitarian justification
award of the copyright owner's actual damages and any additional profits or, in
cases where damages are minimal, statutory damages. See 17 U.S.C. § 504.
76. See supra note 46.
77. The elements of these torts are set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS (1965). See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 88-92 (5th ed. 1984) (setting out the elements).
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B (1965) (collecting state
positions on governmental immunity); CRAIG, supra note 35, § 1.1 (collecting

case law authority for most states).
79. See 1 CRAIG, supra note 38, § 1.1.
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emphasizing social policy considerations such as protecting the state
80
from interference with the execution of governmental functions.
Most states have abolished sovereign immunity for tort claims
against the state directly and on the basis of respondeat superior in
whole or part.8 1 Some states have enacted open-ended waivers of liability which allow for all suits against the state unless expressly excepted.82 Others have retained sovereign immunity subject to specific exceptions. 83 Some states authorize their legislatures to
bills or resolutions to provide compensation on indiconsider special
84
claims.
vidual
Notwithstanding their sovereign immunity waivers, many states
impose procedural requirements and limits on recovery applicable to
suits against the sovereign (and state employees). Most states require
that a notice of a tort claim be filed with the state and that adminis85
trative remedies be exhausted prior to commencing legal action.
Many states establish special courts, boards, or commissions that
have exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the state. In others, a
claimant proceeds to state court after the claim has been presented to
the special board or commission. 86 Some states limit the total
amount and types of damages that may be awarded. 7
Assuming that they can lodge an action against the state and
apart from limits on recovery, intellectual property owners face significant additional hurdles to recovery under state tort causes of action. Federal law preempts any other "legal or equitable rights that
are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright ' 88 and state laws that conflict with or undermine the

80. See 72 AM. JUR. 2D State andLocal Taxation § 99 (1974).
81. See 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability
§ 129 (1988) (collecting Tort Claims Acts of every state).
82. See 1 CRAIG, supra note 38, § 3.5, at 188-92 (collecting statutes).
83. See id. § 3.5 at 192-94 (collecting statutes).
84. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 11.065 (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN. §
28-5-83 (1999). Some state constitutions prohibit state legislatures from passing special legislation to compensate for claims against the state. See, e.g.,
IND. CONST. art. 4, § 24; see also 1 CRAIG, supra note 38, § 3.11.
85. See 1 CRAIG, supra note 38, ch. 5.
86. See id. §§ 3.7-.8.
87. See id. §§ 6.7-.16.
88. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
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comprehensive federal regime for protecting inventions." 9 Nonetheless, the federal regime does not preclude all state causes of action
that protect creativity and innovation. The Copyright Act does not
preempt state laws that require, in order to establish liability, proof of
an "extra element" beyond those required to prove infringement of
one of the exclusive rights granted by federal copyright law. 90 On
this basis, the Second Circuit held that copyright law does not preempt a state misappropriation claim requiring proof that the defendant had appropriated time sensitive information in such a manner as
to threaten the existence of the product or service provided by the
plaintiff.91 The Ninth Circuit has found that the Copyright Act does
not preempt claims requiring proof of conversion of a physical object
92
and claims based on breach of a fiduciary duty.
Similarly, federal patent law does not preempt a state law tort
claim
even if it requires the state court to adjudicate a question of
federal patent law, provided the state law cause of action
includes additional elements not found in the federal patent
law cause of action and is not an impermissible attempt to
offer patent-like protection to subject matter addressed by
93
federal law.
Courts have held that federal patent law does not, in general, preempt
state unfair competition94 or misappropriation doctrines.95
89. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141
(1989). See generally ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
INTHE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (2d ed. 2000) (discussing federal preemption of state law).
90. See National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir.
1997); see also Nicholas Khadder, National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc., Annual Review ofLaw & Technology, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 3
(1998) (summarizing case and history of misappropriation doctrine).
91. See NationalBasketball, 105 F.3d at 853; National Car Rental Sys., Inc.
v. Computer Assocs., Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Smith
v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding that writer's
unfair competition claim which sought to recover profits derived from use of
his ideas was preempted by federal copyright law, but that breach of contract
and confidential relationship claims were not), affd, 738 F.2d 419 (2d Cir.
1984).
92. See Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 620, 636 (9th Cir. 1984).
93. Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
94. See id.
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The broad scope of federal preemption of state tort law related
to the protection of federal intellectual property interests, as well as
the relatively narrow scope of these alternative tort remedies, suggest
that state tort law provides a relatively modest cudgel for intellectual
property owners to fill the gap created by the FloridaPrepaiddecisions. Under the conventional view of preemption doctrine, the
closer state tort law approximates federal patent and copyright law,
the less likely it is to survive preemption scrutiny.
A 1993 decision by the Florida Supreme Court offers an alternative approach to preemption analysis that could bridge the gap left
by the Florida Prepaid decisions. In Jacobs Wind Electric Co. v.
Department of Transportation,96 the plaintiff alleged, in addition to
the takings/inverse condemnation claim discussed earlier, 97 that the
Florida Department of Transportation had committed the tort of conversion by infringing the plaintiffs federal patent. In rejecting the
State's preemption argument, the Florida Supreme Court reasoned
that
Congress could not have intended to reserve for the federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims against states
arising under the patent statutes because such claims could
not have been brought in federal court due to Eleventh
were intended
Amendment immunity. The patent statutes
98
one.
exclude
not
remedy,
a
to provide
The court emphasized that a contrary ruling would not only deny a
particular remedy, but also would deny the plaintiff any "access to
courts to redress its grievances. This cannot be countenanced in light
of article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution, which provides
that '[t]he courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injustice shall be administered without sale, denial or dejury, 9and
' 9
lay.'
Notwithstanding that the Supreme Court cited this aspect of the
100 it remains to be seen
Jacobs Wind case in Florida Prepaid,
whether federal courts will adopt this interpretation of federal
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Corp., 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
626 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1993).
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
Jacobs Wind, 626 So. 2d at 1336.
Id. at 1337.
119 S. Ct. at 2209 n.9.
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preemption when they are directly confronted. In determining the
scope of federal preemption, federal courts have focused upon the
subject matter overlap between state and federal regimes and not on
the entities subject to liability. There is little doubt that the Florida
courts could not adjudicate a conversion claim of this type between
private parties. Yet it seems a bit of a stretch to infer, as the Florida
Supreme Court did, that the U.S. Congress intended for state courts
to adjudicate patent cases against states and state entities. Nonetheless, the Florida Supreme Court's pragmatic logic bolsters the federal
system and because it is limited to actions against states, does not
create a direct jurisdictional conflict.
If the federal courts were to accept this view of federal preemption, intellectual property owners would have to test whether they
could enforce their federal intellectual property rights in like manner
in the courts of each state. Even in Florida, no court has yet held that
infringement of federal intellectual property rights constitutes conversion. Although the common law of conversion has expanded over
the years to encompass some forms of intangible assets, 10 1 it has not
yet been applied to interferences with intellectual property standing
alone.10 2 It remains to be seen whether and to what extent this tort
101. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 222A-249
(1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note 72, at 88-92. The tort of conversion grew

out of the common law action of trover, which provided a remedy against
someone who found lost goods. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242

cmt. d; Hill, A New Found Haliday: The Conversion of IntangiblePropertRe-Examinationof the Action of Trover and Tort of Conversion, 1972 UTAH L.
REv. 511. Therefore, conversion could not apply to land because land could
not be lost. Similarly, intangibles did not fit easily into the category of goods
that can be lost. The tort of conversion has gradually evolved beyond the
common law action of trover. The Restatement Second reflects this trend in

recognizing conversion of documents establishing intangible rights, although
this formulation does not extend directly to intellectual property rights. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242 (1965).

102. See Hurst v. Dezer/Reyes Corp., 82 F.3d 232 (8th Cir. 1996) (reversing
finding of conversion of business concept when licensee continued to use the
licensed name and trade dress after breaching license agreement on grounds
that intangible property right was not identified with or merged in a document); Miles, Inc. v. Scripps Clinic & Research Found., 810 F. Supp. 1091
(S.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that California had not recognized a cause of action
for conversion of the intangible right to commercialize a cell line); KEETON ET
AL., supra note 72, at 92. See generally Jeff C. Dodd, Rights in Information:
Conversion and MisappropriationCauses of Action in Intellectual Property
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theory could be used to obtain remedies for patent and copyright infringement by the state. The larger limitation of this approach would
appear to be whether other states analyze preemption and open up
their courts in this manner. One Texas court has already expressed
some doubts. 10 3 Tort causes of action, as well as the interpretation of
the scope of federal preemption and the extent of waiver of sovereign
immunity, vary across states. Nonetheless, the Florida Supreme
Court's pragmatic interpretations of federal preemption doctrine and
the tort of conversion afford some promise that intellectual property
owners have reasonably effective remedies for state infringement of
their federal rights in at least one state.
c. state intellectualproperty law claims
Even though intellectual property owners cannot sue states for
04
infringing their federal intellectual property rights in state court,1
they may be able to recover in state courts for state violations of state
intellectual property laws. Because of the preemptive sweep of federal copyright and patent law, states cannot duplicate the protection
afforded by these regimes under state law. Nonetheless, they afford
some room for alternative means of protecting innovation. All states
have trade secret laws 10 5 which afford substantial protection for
Cases, 32 HOUS. L. REv. 459, 498 (1995) (concluding that courts "now protect
information that touches some document, giving it an independently verifiable
existence, even though the information is not necessarily merged in or identified with that document"); Val D. Ricks, Comment, The Conversion of Intangible Property:Bursting the Ancient Trover Bottle with New Wine, 1991 BYU
L. REv. 1681, 1703-04 (1991) (listing cases in which conversion has been recognized for intangibles).
103. See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. Texas, 902 S.W.2d 576, 578-79 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1995).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994) provides that federal district courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action arising under any
act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, and copyrights.
Therefore, intellectual property owners may not assert claims under these statutes in state court. Furthermore, under the Supreme Court's decision in Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), states have sovereign immunity against suits in
their own courts for violations of federal law. Therefore, Congress cannot
subject a state to liability for infringing federal intellectual property law in its
own courts without the state's consent.
105. The Supreme Court has ruled that federal patent law does not preempt
state trade secret law. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470
(1974); Warrington Assocs., Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Sys., Inc., 522 F. Supp
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innovation. Forty states have adopted some form of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act.' 0 6 The remaining states rely primarily upon the
principles reflected in the Restatement of Torts or the more comprehensive and recent formulation in the Restatement of Unfair Competition.1 0 7 Unlike the federal patent and copyright regimes, federal
10 8
trademark law does not generally preempt analogous state law.
All states have legislation providing for the registration and protection of trademarks. 109 Numerous states protect the right of publicity,
a relatively recently developed intellectual property right which prevents others from appropriating a person's identity, image, or persona for commercial gain."10
As with tort actions, a claimant cannot sue the state even under
its own intellectual property laws unless the state has waived its sovereign immunity. Where a state has waived its sovereign immunity
through an open-ended statute11 and does not provide exceptions for
367 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
106. See JAMES POOLEY,

TRADE SECRETS § 2.03[7](a), at 2-27 n.51 (1997)
(collecting state codes).
107. See id. § 2.02[3] (explaining evolution of the Restatement relating to
trade secret law).
108. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115(b)(5) (1999) (referring to the continued
effect of state law); Richard A. De Sevo, Antidilution Laws: The Unresolved
Dilemma of Preemption Under the Lanham Act, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 300,
301-04 (1994). But cf Three Blind Mice Designs Co. v. Cyrk Inc., 892 F.
Supp. 303 (D. Mass. 1995) (preempting state antidilution statute to the extent
that it seeks to regulate competitive goods). The recently enacted federal antidilution law, 15 U.S.C. § 43(c)(3), allows state antidilution laws to continue in
force but grants owners of federally registered marks immunity from suit under
such state laws. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374 (accompanying H.R. 1295)
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1033. A number of cases hold that
state protection against confusion and passing off is not preempted by federal
copyright law. See, e.g., Donald Frederick Evans & Assocs., Inc. v. Continental Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1986).
109. Substantially all of these enactments follow the Model State Trademark
Bill. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9

statutory note (1995) (collecting state statutes); J.

THOMAS MCCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (4th ed. 1996).
110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-49; J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY (1937). Fed-

eral intellectual property law does not generally preempt state protection of the
right of publicity. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562
(1977).
111. See supratext accompanying note 82.
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state intellectual property statutes and common law, it can be inferred that the state permits claimants to pursue whatever legal or
administrative process that the state has established for seeking redress."12 Where a state waives sovereign immunity through a closedended statute' 13 and has not expressly authorized suits against the
state for violations of its intellectual property statutes, courts may
hold that the state cannot be sued for violations of its own intellectual
property laws. 1 4 It can be argued, however, that trademark, trade
secret, and right of publicity causes of action grow out of tort theories of recovery. 1 5 To date, there have been relatively few reported
cases determining whether states have waived immunity to liability
under their own intellectual property statutes.
Even if actionable against the state, state intellectual property
law does not directly compensate for state infringement of federal
patent and copyright law. Depending upon the circumstances, however, they may, in concert with other tort remedies discussed earlier,
afford intellectual property owners effective substitutes for federal
patent and copyright protections. For example, a company regularly
doing business with the state may elect to rely more heavily upon
if federal patent protection is not effective
trade secret protection
6
state."
against the
112. See, e.g., Management Ass'n, Inc. v. Board of Regents of N. Ill. Univ.,
618 N.E.2d 694, 707-08 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that state may be sued in
Court of Claims for alleged trade secret violations).
113. See supra text accompanying note 81.
114. See, e.g., Texas A & M Univ. Sys. v. University Book Store, Inc., 683
S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a suit to cancel the certificate of
registration of five service marks issued by the secretary of state to Texas A &
M University was an attempt to control valid and proper state action that was
not maintainable without the state's consent).
115. Trade secret protection was part of the first RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§
757-59 (1939). Trademark law comprises various aspects of unfair competition, unjust enrichment, passing off, and various other tort law concepts, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 9 cmts. b & c (1995), al-

though the antidilution provisions reflect more of a property orientation. See
PETER

S.

MENELL,

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY:

GENERAL

THEORIES,

INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (2000). The right
of publicity also has tort roots, growing out of defamation, privacy, and false
advertising principles. See MCCARTHY, supranote 105, at ch. 1.
116. Cf MERGES ET AL., supra note 84; David D. Friedman et al., Some
Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 61 (1991); Richard

C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from IndustrialResearch and De-
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d. contract claims

Intellectual property owners may have a contractual basis for
seeking damages and other remedies from states. States often contract for products and services that involve intellectual property
rights. A state agency may agree to restrictions on the use and distribution of products embodying intellectual property as part of a licensing agreement or some other contractual nexus. Software vendors, for example, commonly distribute computer programs through
end-user licensing agreements. 117 Intellectual property owners who
present proposals to state agencies may be able to draw upon principles of implied contract and confidential relationship law. 118 Intellectual property owners may be able to enforce these provisions
through state court contract actions.
As with tort claims, intellectual property owners can bring contract claims against the state only if the state has waived its sovereign
immunity and authorized suit for such claims. Many states expressly
waive their sovereign immunity for contractual liability through their
constitution 19 or by state statute.
In addition, many state courts
velopment, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783-831 (1987) (noting

the importance of trade secrets relative to patent protection in many industries).
117. See generally MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET
LAW ch. 1 (2000).
118. See Lionel S. Sobel, TheLaw ofldeas, Revisited, 1 UCLA ENT. L. REV.
9 (1994).
119. See GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, IX(c); LA. CONST. art. 12, § 10(A).
120. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (Michie 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. §§

19-10-201 to 210 (Michie 1999); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 884 (West 1999);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4-61(a) (1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-1 (1999); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 661-1 (1999); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/8 (West 1999); IND.
CODE § 34-4-16-1.1 (1999); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45A.245 (Michie 1999);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 1510-A (West 1999); MD. CODE ANN., STATE
GOV'T § 12-201(a) (1999); MINN. STAT. § 3.751 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. §

41.031 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 491:8 (1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
37-1-23 (Michie 1999); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1999); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-12-02 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A)(1) (West
1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.320 (1999); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4651-1 (1999);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 37-13.1-1 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-32-2, -10

(Michie 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(L) (1999); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 63-30-5 (1999); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.010 (1999); W. VA. CODE
§§ 14-2-4, -13 (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-39-104 (Michie 1999); see also
Parsa v. State, 474 N.E.2d 235 (N.Y. 1984) (charging contracting party with
knowledge of statutes regulating the state's power to enter into contracts).
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infer that a state waives its sovereign immunity for contractual liability by validly entering into a contract. 12 1 Some state courts have
122
abolished sovereign immunity for contractual liability altogether.
Only a few states bar suits in state court for breach of contract
claims against the state. Vermont does not apply its waiver of tort
liability to "damages caused by the fiscal operations of any state officer or department." 123 Wisconsin requires that contract claims
against the state be presented to a Claims Board which can propose
124
to the legislature that a private bill for compensation be enacted.
The Texas Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the vitality of sover125
eign immunity from contractual liability in the Lone Star State.
Even though substantially all states allow contract actions
against the state to be heard in state court, some contractual provisions that overlap substantially with federal intellectual property
rights may be preempted. Contractual provisions that do not implicate the policies of the federal intellectual property system easily
survive scrutiny, even if a state tribunal must assess the validity of a

121. See, e.g., State Highway Dep't v. Milton Constr. Co., 586 So. 2d 872,
875 (Ala. 1991); Souza & McCue Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d
508, 370 P.2d 338, 20 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1962); Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agric., 314 P.2d 278, 280 (Colo. 1957); George & Lynch, Inc. v.
State, 197 A.2d 734, 736 (Del. 1964); Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Department
of Corrections, 471 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1985); Regents of Univ. Sys. v. Blanton,
176 S.E. 673, 675 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934); Grant Constr. Co. v. Bums, 443 P.2d
1005, 1010 (Idaho 1968); Kersten Co. v. Department of Soc. Servs., 207
N.W.2d 117, 120 (Iowa 1973); J.A. Sullivan Corp. v. Commonwealth, 494
N.E.2d 374, 377 (Mass. 1986); Hersey Gravel Co. v. State, 9 N.W.2d 567, 569
(Mich. 1943); State Highway Comm'n v. Wunderlich, 11 So. 2d 437, 438
(Miss. 1943); V.S. DiCarlo Constr. Co. v. State, 485 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Mo.
1972); Meens v. State Bd. of Educ., 267 P.2d 981, 984-85 (Mont. 1954); Smith
v. State, 222 S.E.2d 412, 423-24 (N.C. 1976); State Bd. of Pub. Affairs v.
Principal Funding Corp., 542 P.2d 503, 505-06 (Okla. 1975); Kinsey Constr.
Co. v. South Carolina Dep't of Mental Health, 249 S.E.2d 900, 903 (S.C.
1978); Wiecking v. Allied Med. Supply Corp., 391 S.E.2d 258, 261 (Va.
1990).
122. See Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 381 P.2d 107, 109 (Ariz.
1963); Brown v. Wichita State Univ., 540 P.2d 66, 84-86 (Kan. 1975); Todd v.
Board of Educ. Lands & Funds, 48 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Neb. 1951); P. T. & L.
Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, Dep't of Transp., 288 A.2d 574, 578 (N.J. 1972).
123. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5601 (1999).
124. See WIs. STAT. § 16.007 (1999).
125. See Federal Sign v. Texas S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. 1997).
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federal intellectual property right in the process of adjudicating the
contract dispute. 12 6 Those contractual restrictions that undermine the
127
policies of the federal intellectual property system are preempted.
Courts have struggled to develop clear principles with regard to the
viability of software licensing agreements that supplant some of
copyright's default rules. 128 This challenge has been exacerbated by
the fact that computer software vendors and Internet retailers have
increasingly used shrinkwrap and clickwrap license agreements in
transacting. 129 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recently approved the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), which generally permits parties to
enforce shrinkwrap agreements. Under the Supremacy Clauge of the
U.S. Constitution, however, the enforceability of contracts pursuant
126. See, e.g., Intermedics Infusaid, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn.,
804 F.2d 129, 132-33 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("[T]here are no policies reflected in

acts of Congress which require that the federal courts enjoin... a state court
contract suit seeking royalties payable under a patent license wherein the state
court is or could be asked by the defendant to rule on the validity of the patent."); Smith, 578 F. Supp. at 1307 (holding that breach of contract and confidential relationship claims are not preempted by copyright law), affd, 738
F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1984).
127. See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) (invalidating contractual provision prohibiting licensee to challenge the validity of patent);
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964) (holding unenforceable patent licensed in agreement that extends beyond the patent's term).
128. Compare Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir.
1991) (holding that disclaimer of warranty and limitation of remedies terms in
a shrinkwrap license agreement did not become part of parties' agreement),
and Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding
that a provision in the license agreement of a producer of anticopying software
which prohibited decompilation or disassembly of its program was unenforceable), with ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (taking a
narrow view of federal copyright preemption in enforcing shrinkwrap license
agreements that prohibited the copying of uncopyrightable material), and Hill
v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that terms sent
to buyer in the box in which the computer was shipped, including an arbitration clause, were binding on the buyer). See generally Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual PropertyLicensing, 87
CAL. L. Rv. 111, 142 (1999) ("[Courts must] attempt to figure out whether

each particular provision in the Copyright Act is merely a default rule that the

parties are free to ignore, or whether it instead reflects a part of the balance of
interests in federal policy that should not be upset.").
129. See Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D.
Utah 1997).
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to state laws remain subject to the preemptive force of copyright and
other federal laws.
As this review of the vast and complex legal landscape reveals,
the striking down of the intellectual property remedy clarification
acts does not exempt states from liability for infringing intellectual
property rights. Federal law continues to provide prospective remedies to enjoin infringement of federal intellectual property rights. In
addition, intellectual property owners can recover monetary damages
from state employees who violate federal intellectual property rights.
Furthermore, state remedies for inverse condemnation and violations
of tort, state intellectual property, and contract laws create a variety
of opportunities for intellectual property owners to pursue retrospective monetary damages. The amount of damages available through
these forms of recourse may well be less than the remedies under
federal patent and copyright law. In addition, many of these state
law theories have not been widely tested in the context of intellectual
property rights. The lack of uniformity and novel aspects of these
avenues of legal and administrative recourse will complicate the
lives of intellectual property owners whose rights are infringed by
states and state officials. Intellectual property owners with smaller
stakes may well decide that these remedies are not worth the effort.
B. Social andBureaucraticConstraintson State Infringement of
IntellectualPropertyRights
Even if the law afforded state and state actors complete immunity from liability for infringement of federal intellectual property
rights, social and bureaucratic constraints, market restraints, and political checks would significantly regulate state infringement activity.130 These various constraints are often interrelated. In addition,
they interact with the legal constraints discussed previously. It is
worthwhile, however, to explore each of these governance regimes
individually so as to better understand the implications of the Florida
Prepaid decisions. This section focuses on the role of social norms
and bureaucratic constraints in regulating state infringement. The
treatment of each regulatory institution will discuss some of the
130. Cf ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (emphasizing the role of social norms in regulating
human behavior).
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feedback and interactive effects among the various governance systems.
1. Distinctive characteristics of public administration
Economic analysis of legal rules often proceeds from the premise that entities and actors will maximize their economic self-interest.
In such a framework, we would predict that entities and actors will
infringe intellectual property rights if there are no remedies to penalize such behavior and such infringement promotes their economic
self-interest. Therefore, assuming that there were no effective remedies against state infringement, then state governments and their employees would be prone to infringe federal intellectual property
rights. This perspective, however, overlooks the role of social norms
and other institutional constraints upon the behavior of the relevant
entities and actors. State entities and employees do not typically approach their jobs from a narrowly self-interested perspective. Furthermore, they operate within complex institutional structures that
regulate the actions of both the entities and the employees.
The environment in which state entities and employees operate
differs markedly from the private sector.1 3 1 With regard to the propensity to infringe intellectual property rights, the following characteristics have most relevance: the nature of the activities conducted,
the goals of the organization, the ethics and integrity of decisionmakers, the extent to which employee conduct is constrained by rules
and policies, the openness and permeability of the working environment, the accountability of employees, incentives for employee advancement, and the profile of the workforce.
Nature of Activities. State agencies and entities perform a wide
range of functions, many of which differ in significant ways from
private sector enterprises. State agencies and organizations regulate
private activities that cause adverse effects-such as pollution,
crime, and health and safety exposures-provide various social
services, assist markets in functioning by licensing and regulating
activities, offer education, health care, and other services, and provide and maintain basic infrastructure such as roads and
131. See HAL G. RAINEY,
ORGANIZATIONS 73-74 (2d ed.

UNDERSTANDING

&

MANAGING

PUBLIC

1997) (table summarizing distinctive charac-

teristics of public management of organizations).
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transportation. Because of the differences among these functions,
state entities differ significantly in the ways in which they are organized and the compositions of their work forces.
Goals. In view of the nature of these activities and the essential
public-regarding qualities of government, state entities, unlike most
private sector enterprises, do not seek to maximize profits. Rather
they typically pursue multiple, sometimes competing, goals. For example, state police and highway patrols seek to protect public safety,
prevent crime, and respect individual rights, as well as conserve
public resources. 132 Environmental agencies are instructed to both
conserve resources and develop them.133 State entities, therefore,
tend to pursue more multifaceted,
ambiguous, and conflicting goals
134
corporations.
private
than
Ethics and Integrity of Decisionmakers. The public holds government entities and officials to higher standards of fairness, honesty,
openness, and accountability than private actors. As a reflection of
government officials' quasi-fiduciary responsibility to protect the
public trust, the American Society for Public Administration stresses,
in its code of ethics, the need for public administrators to "respect,
support, study, and when necessary, work to improve federal and
state constitutions, and other laws which define the relationships
135
among public agencies, employees, clients, and all citizens."
Rule-Oriented Work Environment. State government organizations tend to be bureaucratic and rule driven. This is partly attributable to the large size of many public entities, but also reflects legal
constraints and oversight by legislative and executive bodies and
civil service and union rules.
132. See MARK H. MOORE, POLICE LEADERSHIP: THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM,
reprintedin IMPOSSIBLE JOBS IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT (Erwin C. Hargrove &
John C. Glidewell eds., 1990).
133. See AARON B. WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER 215
134.

(1979).

See THEODORE I. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1979); RAINEY, su-

pra note 126, at 128-30; HAROLD SEIDMAN & ROBERT GILMOUR, POLITICS,

POSITION, AND POWER (1986).
135. AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, CODE OF ETHICS
AND IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES (1984); see Donald J. Maletz, The Place of

Constitutionalism in the Education of Public Administrators, 23 ADMIN. &
SOC'Y 374 (1991); Ralph C. Chandler, The Problem of Moral Reasoning in
American Public Administration: The Case for a Code of Ethics, 43 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 32 (1983).
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Openness and Permeabilityof Working Environment. Government entities conduct their activities through public processes. Many
important decisions are made through formal, on the record, processes in which citizens have the opportunity to participate through
submitting comments and attending public hearings. In the postWatergate era, most states adopted far-reaching freedom of information laws that afford citizens and the media wide access to public records. 136 The media, agency clients and constituents, and interested
citizens can gain access to much of what public entities do. By contrast, the decision-making processes of most private corporations are
shielded from public view. Many companies consider information
developed within their factories and offices to be trade secrets.
Accountability of State Employees. Public employees are typically accountable to a wide range of constituencies. They fall under
the governance of executive and legislative oversight bodies, as well
as other governing authorities. For example, the University of California is governed by a Board of Regents selected by the governor.
Its budget is determined by the legislature and approved by the governor. The performance of public entities is scrutinized by various
external constituencies, including the media, interest groups, and
others.
Incentives for Advancement. The rigid bureaucratic structure of
public entities-reflecting the rule-oriented work environment and
civil service and union influences-constrain the ways in which employees may advance within the public sector employment hierarchy.
Because of the multifaceted, vague, and sometimes ambiguous goals
of government entities, public organizations do not have the same
ability as private profit-centered enterprises to develop clear performance measures. As a result, they tend to evaluate employee performance based on adherence to procedure and compliance with
13 7
rules.
136. See generally JUSTIN B. FRANKLIN & ROBERT E. BOUCHARD, THE

(2d ed. 1999) (compiling
public information acts from each state).
137. See Allen H. Barton, A Diagnosis of Bureaucratic Maladies, in
MAKING BUREAUCRACIES WORK (C.H. Weiss & A.H. Barton eds., 1980);
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIvACY ACTS

ROBERT A. DAHL & CHARLES

E. LINDBLOOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND

Hal G. Rainey, PublicAgencies and Private Firms: Incentive Structures, Goals, and IndividualRoles, 15 ADMIN. & SOC'Y 207 (1983).
WELFARE (1953);
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Profile of the Public Sector Workforce. The financial rewards
available in public employment are constrained by civil service and
legislative pay scales. The civil service system and the high rate of
unionization in the public sector typically afford public employees
better job security than those in the private sector. Not surprisingly,
studies reveal that public employment attracts workers seeking this
balance of job attributes: public employees place a higher value on
job security, 138 but a lower value on financial rewards, 139 than their
counterparts in the private sector. Similarly, the public sector tends
to attract employees who place higher a value on intrinsic rewards,
140
self-sacrifice, and public service than workers in the private sector.
2. Implications for state infringement of federal
intellectual property rights
These distinctive characteristics of state government suggest that
state entities are unlikely to adopt policies encouraging, permitting,
or excusing infringement of federal intellectual property rights. The
FloridaPrepaiddecisions do not condone state infringement; rather,
they limit the ways in which intellectual property owners can enforce
their rights against states. But it is unlikely, given our organizational
culture and institutional constraints, that states or state organizations
will embark on policies that conflict with federal law. State entities
generally require that their employees adhere to federal and state law
in carrying out their responsibilities. Many also have specific policies relating to intellectual property. For example, the University of
California has specific policies and guidelines designed to ensure
4
that employees do not violate federal intellectual property law.1 1
Nor are state officials or employees likely to infringe intellectual
property rights. The public sector attracts workers who are disinclined to violate the law. Moreover, state employees operate within
138. See RAINEY, supranote 131, at 213-15.
139. See Mak Khojasteh, Motivating the Privatevs. Public Sector Managers,
22 PuB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 391 (1993); Rainey, supra note 132, at 207.
140. See RAINEY, supra note 131, at 216-18; Steven Kelman, "Public
Choice" and Public Spirit, 87 PuB. INTEREST 80 (Spring 1987) (arguing that

public employees reflect a norm of public spiritedness).

141. See, e.g., University of CaliforniaPolicy and Guidelines on the Reproduction of CopyrightedMaterialsfor Teaching and Research (visited Mar. 30,
2000) <http://www.ucop.edu/ucophome/uwnews/copyrep.html>.
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highly structured and open environments in which their activities can
be easily scrutinized by supervisory officials as well as the public.
Furthermore, they cannot expect to profit in any significant way from
infringing activities-either through direct commercial activities or
improving the bottom line for their division-because government
employees do not have equity stakes in their operations and state
agencies do not budget within a profit-maximizing framework. By
engaging in significant infringing activities, public employees open
themselves up to being sued in their personal capacity for monetary
damages and expose their employers to injunctions and embarrassing
public scrutiny. Although the public employees might be able to get
indemnification and representation by the public entity, they jeopardize their job security, something that public employees generally
value highly. Therefore, they have little if anything to gain, and a lot
to lose, from infringing federal intellectual property rights.
This is not to say that state entities and employees will never infringe federal intellectual property rights. State entities and employees may unintentionally infringe such rights, but it is likely that they
will be responsive to the interested parties in many circumstances. In
some cases, state entities may not invoke state sovereignty. 142 Furthermore, as noted in the prior section, intellectual property owners
are not without legal recourse. Even in the absence of these disincentives, the nature of public entities and the employees attracted to
them suggest that state infringement, to 'the extent it occurs, is likely
to be unintentional and episodic in most areas of state activity.
One area in which social and bureaucratic constraints will
probably have less of a dampening effect on state infringement relates to state university research. 143 University laboratories have
produced many of the breakthroughs on which the biotechnology and
digital technology industries are based. A number of developments
have drawn universities into the commercial sphere, which inevitably
raises the potential for infringement of intellectual property rights.
142. See, e.g., Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1997) (sovereign immunity not invoked), affd, 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
286 (1999).
143. See Robert G. Bone, From Property to Contract: The Eleventh Amendment and University-Private Sector Intellectual Property Relationships, 33
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1467 (2000).
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First, many state legislatures have gradually decreased the percentage of the universities' budgets funded through state tax revenues.
Second, the growth rate of federal funding of university research has
gradually declined over the past decade. 144 Third, the federal government, which provides funding for a substantial portion of university research, now permits universities (and other nonprofit organi145
zations) to retain title to inventions funded from federal sources.
Fourth, government funding for university research has vacillated
over the years, motivating universities to expand their portfolio of
funding sources. 146 As a result, a number of
leading state universi1 47
ties have developed patent licensing offices.
Lastly, university researchers and professors have increasingly
pursued opportunities to commercialize their research. The advent
and proliferation of venture financing has enabled university researchers to start their own companies, leading many research pioneers to spin off university research projects into private commercial
ventures in which the university researcher is a substantial
stakeholder. These opportunities have changed the culture of

144. See

NATIONAL

SCIENCE

BOARD,

SCIENCE

AND

ENGINEERING

INDICATORS: 1998 chs. 4-5.
145. See Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28
(1980) (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (1994)). See generally
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, PublicResearch and PrivateDevelopment: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV.

1663 (1996).
146. See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 144, at ch. 5 (noting that
for 1995, public academic institutions received 7% of research and development funding from industry, 10% from state and local funds, 23% from institutional funds, and 54% from the federal government and that over the past
two decades, the federal share of support has declined, and the industry and institutional shares have increased).
147. See, e.g., Office of Technology Transfer, University of California (visited Apr. 1, 2000) <http://www.ucop.edu/ott/> (providing descriptions of technologies available for licensing from the University of California campuses).
See generally NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 139, at ch. 5 (noting a
sevenfold rise in the number of academic patents received annually between
the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s to more than 1800 in 1995 and that public
universities outpace private universities in obtaining patents); R. HENDERSON
ET AL., UNIVERSITIES AS A SOURCE OF COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGY: A
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF UNIVERSITY PATENTING 1965-88 (National Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5068, 1995).
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university research laboratories. 148 Many university scientists entering public universities today seek both academic recognition and entrepreneurial opportunity.
State university researchers and professors have not typically fit
the traditional civil servant mold, but their traditional focus upon
academic recognition and basic scientific breakthroughs minimized
the risk that they would infringe or cause harm to the intellectual
property rights of others. As state universities and their researchers
look increasingly to the market for organizational and personal returns, the risks to intellectual property right owners rise accordingly.
Not surprisingly, state universities are the one type of state entity that
has been involved
in numerous and substantial intellectual property
149
disputes.

The implications of these trends are further complicated by the
150
in-flow of industry funds into state university research programs.
148. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ProprietaryRights and the Norms of Science
in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987).
149. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Regents, 143 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998),
judgment vacated and remanded, 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999); In re Regents, Misc.
No. 425, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 8032 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 21, 1995); Synbiotics
Corp. v. Regents, No. 93-1253, 94-1079, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23902 (Fed.
Cir. Aug. 29, 1994); In re Regents, 964 F.2d 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1992); New Star
Lasers, Inc. v. Regents, No. CIV. S-99-428, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13411
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 1999); Kucharczyk v. Regents, 48 F. Supp. 2d 964 (N.D.
Cal. 1999); Regents v. Veterinary Ctrs. of America, Inc., No. 1262, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1741 (J.P.M.L. Feb. 19, 1999); Candela Corp. v. Regents, 976 F.
Supp. 90 (D. Mass. 1997); Regents v. Oncor, Inc., No. C-95-3084-VRW, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15068 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 1997); Dieter v. Regents, 963 F.
Supp. 908 (E.D. Cal. 1997); Brown v. Regents, 866 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Cal.
1994); Unix Sys. Labs., Inc. v. Berkeley Software Design, Inc., 832 F. Supp.
790 (D.N.J. 1993); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alza Corp., No. 91-5286, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3971 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 1993).
150. See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAw 1026-29
(1998); NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 139, at ch. 5; Richard C. Atkinson, The Future Arrives Firstin California,ISSUES INSci. & TECH. 45, 4648 (Winter 1999-2000) (describing the University of California's IndustryUniversity Cooperative Research Program); William L. Baldwin, The U.S. Research University and the Joint Venture: Evolution of an Institution, 11 REv.
INDUST. ORG. 629 (1996); David Blumenthal et al., IndustrialSupport of University Research in Biotechnology, 231 SCIENCE 242, 244 (1986) (observing

that nearly half of all biotechnology firms support university research through

university-industry research programs); W.M. Cohen et al., Industry and the
Academy: Uneasy Partners in the Cause of Technological Advance, in
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Many of these programs create partnerships which enable donor
firms to commercialize some of the research developed. This raises
complex questions about whether the research is in fact public.
C. Market Responses to the Risks of State Infringement of
IntellectualPropertyRights
Even apart from legal action, intellectual property owners can
engage in a variety of self-help responses to the risk of state infringement of intellectual property rights. They can take advantage
of their economic clout directly in their dealings with states and state
entities by getting involved in state and federal politics.
With regard to market responses, intellectual property owners
have a wide range of relationships with the states. At one extreme,
they engage in direct, detailed negotiations for products and services
customized to the states needs such as standardized tests for state
employees, training films, and customized data processing software.
Similarly, many state universities now enter into long-term contractual relationships in the form of industry-university research consortia and funding agreements. At the other extreme, the state can gain
access to proprietary technology without any formal contractual relationship. For example, a state university professor can learn of a
proprietary technology by perusing issued patents or scientific publications. Between these extremes, states acquire technology products
(such as word processing software) through the retail marketplace.
Intellectual property owners can protect their technology from
improper appropriation by legal strangers-those with whom they
are not in a contractual relationship-by limiting access to their
works through either formal trade secrecy 151 or encryption. If state
entities cannot gain access to a work, then they cannot commandeer
it. These strategies can have significant drawbacks. By relying upon
trade secret, rather than patent protection, an inventor has no protection against someone who independently develops the invention. In
addition, the inventor might even lose the right to practice his or her
(Roger Noll ed., 1998).
151. In fact, apart from the pharmaceutical industry, most companies rely
more heavily upon trade secret protection than patent protection to discourage
unauthorized appropriation of their technology. See Levin et al., supra note
116, at 783.
CHALLENGE TO THE RESEARCH UNIVERSITY
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invention if another company obtains a patent. From society's
standpoint, trade secrecy can hinder the progress of research and development by limiting the diffusion of new knowledge. By contrast,
the patent system promotes disclosure of innovation by requiring that
applicants adequately disclose and enable their invention. Encryption can limit the utility of a work by constraining the manner in
which the work can be used and customized.
Where an intellectual property owner has a formal, detailed
contractual relationship with a state, the intellectual property owner
can protect against infringement through the agreement. In substantially all states, such agreements will be enforceable in state court.
The intellectual property owner could also insist upon waiver of state
sovereign immunity to federal lawsuits, although such waivers might
require legislative authorization in some states. The key determinants will be the respective bargaining power of the parties and the
extent to which state law limits the terms of such contracts.
Focusing on the state university context, which appears to be the
area of greatest concern for infringement, the formation of industryuniversity research agreements provides intellectual property owners
with more concentrated leverage for insisting upon protection from
infringement. State universities receive approximately seven percent
of their research funding, on average, from private sources. 15 2 These
relationships typically involve shared and ongoing governance be153
tween universities and private sector partners.
When the state acquires access to technology through the retail
marketplace, intellectual property can augment their federal intellectual property protections through contractual limitations on infringement. The software industry has increasingly relied on these
mechanisms through the use of shrinkwrap and clickwrap licensing
152. See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 144, at ch. 5.
153. The Government-University-Industry Research Roundtable, which is
sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of
Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine, oversees approximately a dozen
research consortia between universities and industry. The Roundtable "addresses a wide array of concerns including nurturing science and engineering

talent, fmancing research facilities, promoting multidisciplinary research and
education, and enhancing federal-state cooperation in science and technology."
The Government-University-Industry Research Roundtable (visited Mar. 26,
2000) <http://www4.nationalacademies.org/pd/guirr.nsf>.
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agreements. Although the enforceability of these contracts has not
been decisively resolved,15 4 intellectual property owners will at a
minimum get their day in state court. Substantially all states have
consented to suit for breach of contract.
D. PoliticalConstraintson State Infringement ofFederal
IntellectualPropertyRights
In addition to market solutions, intellectual property owners can
deter state infringement of intellectual property rights through political efforts. As a class, intellectual property owners have tremendous
political clout. Entertainment industries have long been involved in
national and state politics.15 5 New technology companies are among
the most successful and wealthy enterprises in the United States.
Over the past two decades, they have become increasingly involved
in political affairs. American technology companies initially mobilized in the early 1980s in an effort to push for stronger protection in
recently,
More
abroad.15 6
intellectual property laws
high-technology companies 157 and their trade associations1 5 8 have
154. See supra Part I.A.2.d.
155. The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), representing the
seven largest film production and distribution companies, and the Recording
Industry Association of America (RIAA), representing the leading record producers, have long been among the most active and influential lobbying organizations in the United States. See William F. Patry, Copyright and the Legislative Process: A Personal Perspective, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139
(1996); William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 922-24 (1997) (noting the
strong political power of traditional copyright interests); Sabra Chartrand,
CongressHas Extended Its Protectionfor Goofy, Gershwin, and Some Moguls
of the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1998, at C2.
156. See generally MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL
COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ch. 4 (1998).
157. See Bernard Dagenais, AOL Learns Lobby Game Is Necessary Expense,
WASH. TIMES, May 24, 1999, at D3; Rick Hepp, Silicon Prairie,CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 17, 1999, at N1 (reporting that "the high technology industry is quickly
overcoming its aversion to the [political] process in an attempt to influence upcoming legislation and the 2000 elections"); Carla Marinucci & Marc Sandalow, Silicon Valley Emerges As a Force In Politics: Divided Party Loyalties
Put in 2000 Spotlight, S.F. CHRON., May 10, 1999, at Al; Charles Piller,
Technet to Campaignfor Issues of the 'New Economy'; Politics:Roberta Katz
Now Heads the Wealthy Lobbying Group that Is Likely to Be a MajorPlayer in
the 2000 Election, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 1999, at Cl; Sam Howe Verhovek,
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become deeply involved in lobbying and financing political campaigns.
Intellectual property interests can exert political pressure to prevent state infringement of intellectual property rights at both the state
and federal levels. At the state level, they can directly lobby state officials to proscribe infringement of intellectual property rights by
state entities and employees. Intellectual property owners can also
lobby legislatures to waive sovereign immunity to suits in federal
court or to make it easier for intellectual property owners to obtain
remedies in state courts. As an inducement, economically powerful
companies can threaten to invest only in states that provide sufficient
protection for intellectual property rights. If infringement occurs
predominantly in a particular sector of state government, such as
state universities, then intellectual property interests can focus their
efforts on the elected officials and governing boards that oversee and
fund those state entities.
At the federal level, intellectual property owners can pursue a
range of strategies to combat the risk of state infringement. The intellectual property remedy clarification acts of the early 1990s were a
response to court decisions opening up a state immunity gap in the
federal intellectual property system, 159 and the legislative wheels
have already begun to turn since the Florida Prepaiddecisions reopened that gap. 16° Even after the FloridaPrepaiddecisions, Congress has a range of options for constraining infringement of federal
intellectual property rights by states, including clarifying congressional intent to allow Exparte Young actions to prevent violations of
federal law, conditional federal funding, conditional intellectual
CandidatesFallinginto the Open Arms ofHigh Technology, N.Y. TIMES, May
11, 1999, at Al.
158. Among the leading high-technology intellectual property lobbying organizations are the Business Software Alliance (BSA), the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), the Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers
of America (PhRMA), and, most recently, Technology Network (TechNet).
159. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); Chew v.
California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Lane v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston,
871 F.2d 166 (lst Cir. 1989); BV Eng'g v. UCLA, 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir.
1988); Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988).
160. See Legislation: Draft Bill Would Restore Right to Sue States for Infringement, 58 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 806 (1999) (summarizing bill proposed by Sen. Patrick Leahy).
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property rights, concurrent jurisdiction extending jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1498 to include actions against states, federal enforcement, remedial legislation under paragraph 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and constitutional amendment.
Ex parte Young Actions. The Supreme Court's decision in
Seminole Tribe16 1 added a new wrinkle to the availability of relief in
federal court under the doctrine of Ex parte Young. Where a federal
statute contains comprehensive enforcement mechanisms inconsistent with an injunctive remedy in federal court, then injunctive relief
under the doctrine of Ex parte Young is not available.162 Therefore,
Congress can enhance the viability of lawsuits brought by intellectual property owners to enjoin infringement of the rights by states by
clarifying its intention to allow such remedial relief.
Conditional Funding. Congress has often used its spending
power to prod states to implement federal policies. For example,
Congress withholds federal highway and other funding from states
and state agencies failing to conform to federal pollution standards. 163 The Supreme Court has upheld the use of conditions in
federal funding, even where the federal government arguably im64
pinges upon rights that the U.S. Constitution vests with the states.'
Conditional federal funding could be particularly useful to combat
infringement of federal intellectual property rights by state universities and research hospitals. The federal government-through the
National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, the
National Endowment for the Arts, the Department of Energy, the
Department of Defense, and other agencies-provides a substantial
proportion of research funding to state universities. Therefore, the
161. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
162. Id. at 73-76. See Meltzer, supranote 31, at 36-48.
163. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(2) (1999). See also Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 167 F.3d 641 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (holding that federal regulation permitting approval of transportation
project that appeared in previous conforming plan but did not appear in currently conforming plan violated Clean Air Act).
164. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding a federal
statute withholding a portion of federal construction funds from states with
drinking ages below twenty-one). See generally Meltzer, supra note 31, at 5153 ("There is ... no single unconstitutional conditions doctrine: sometimes
conditions on the enjoyment of constitutional rights are tolerated and sometimes not, and no simple formula tells us which is which.").
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federal government could require that state entities respect federal
intellectual property rights in order to receive these funds. The federal government could also seek to obtain legislative waivers by the
states as a condition for their universities being eligible to receive
federal funding.
Conditional Intellectual Property Rights. In the Supreme
Court's College Savings Bank decision, Justice Scalia commented
that Congress may compel a waiver of sovereign immunity where a
state receives a "gift or gratuity" or "federal beneficence" that Congress may rightfully withhold.165 Using this option, Senator Leahy
has proposed legislation that would require states to waive sovereign
immunity from suits that arise under federal intellectual property
laws as a condition for obtaining their own federal intellectual property rights. 166 In his statement introducing the bill, Senator Leahy
noted that all fifty states own or have obtained patents and that some
states hold several hundred patents. 167 Congress may not, however,
compel state waiver through inducements that are "so coercive as to
pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion""' 168 or exclude the state from otherwise lawful activity. 169 It is unclear
whether this sort of waiver70 would be so disproportionate as to constitute improper coercion.
Concurrent Jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent and copyright infringement actions.
Congress could amend this provision to

165. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 119 S.Ct. 2219,2231 (1999).
166. See Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 1999, S. 1835,
106th Cong. (1999), reprinted in 58 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) 819.
167. See 150 Cong. Rec. S13,557 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1999) (remarks of Sen.
Leahy).
168. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.

548, 590 (1937)).
169. See College Savings Bank, 119 S.Ct. at 2231.
170. Cf.Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav.
Bank, 119 S.Ct. 2199, 2210 (chiding Congress for not limiting "the coverage
of the [Patent Remedy] Act to cases involving arguable constitutional violations, such as where a State refuses any state-court remedy for patent owners
whose patents it [violates]," or to "types of infringement, such as nonnegligent
infringement or infringement authorized pursuant to state policy").
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authorize state courts to hear infringement actions against states and
tailoring available remedies appropriately. States, however, could
thwart this means of circumventing the FloridaPrepaid decisions.
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Alden v. Maine,17 1 states
could preclude such suits by not waiving immunity to be sued in
their own courts for violations of federal intellectual property law.
Creating such concurrent jurisdiction would, at a minimum, force
some states to invoke sovereign immunity expressly. Those states
with open-ended waiver regimes' 72 would have to exempt such actions affirmatively, which could be politically unpopular.
This proposal could undermine the uniformity of the federal intellectual property system by creating a parallel system of adjudication of intellectual property claims arising under federal law. 173 As
noted in Part I of this Article, however, states were rarely haled into
federal court when sovereign immunity did not stand in the way and
there are important social and political constraints upon state infringement of federal intellectual property rights. In addition, even
though the Eleventh Amendment stands in the way of suits being
filed in federal court against states for infringement of intellectual
property rights without their consent, Congress could require that appeals of state court adjudications of federal intellectual property
rights be heard exclusively in federal courts of appeal-with patent
appeals directed to the Federal Circuit and appeals of other intellectual property cases channeled to the appropriate regional court of appeals. This option would limit the extent to which state court systems would stray from federal court interpretation of intellectual
property law.
Federal/State Compromise. Part of the reason that states take
umbrage at the intellectual property remedy clarification acts is that
they expose states to greater potential liability than the federal

171. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
172. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
173. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-282, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1989) (commenting that allowing state court adjudication of federal copyright claims
would frustrate the "essential premise" of the Copyright Act of 1976 "to create
a uniform Federal system for the creation and enforcement of copyrights").
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74
government for infringement of federal intellectual property rights. 1
The federal government is not liable for injunctive relief, treble damages for willful patent infringement, or more than the minimal statutory damages, 175 whereas the remedy clarification acts sought to treat
states no differently than private actors, exposing them to the full
range and extent of remedies available in lawsuits against private infringers. The federal government might able to achieve an adequate
and more politically viable result by expanding 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to
authorize suits against states on the same terms as those applicable to
the federal government. This approach respects the dignity of states
while providing intellectual property owners with an established
means of enforcing their rights in a federal forum. Furthermore,
given the distinctive character of public institutions, 176 there is a
strong normative basis for not subjecting governmental entities to
punitive and intent-based remedies. Governments do not operate as
profit-oriented enterprises and are subject to freedom of information
requirements and open meeting laws that reduce the risk of undetected infringement. As an inducement to states participating in this
regime (and formally waiving sovereign immunity), Congress could
couple this change with either the conditional funding 177 or conditional intellectual property rights 178 proposals. Such a linkage would
be less likely to struck down as so disproportionate as to constitute
improper coercion.
Federal Enforcement. Because the Eleventh Amendment does
not immunize states from lawsuits by the United States in federal
court, Congress could develop a new mechanism for enforcing federal intellectual property rights against states. For example, Congress could enact a regime authorizing federal authorities to enforce
federal intellectual property rights against states and state entities.

174. See Eugene Volokh, Sovereign Immunity, 73 UNIV. SO. CAL. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2000).
175. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (limiting patent and copyright recovery to "reasonable and entire compensation" including minimum statutory damages in the
case of copyright infringement); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (addressing costs
and fees).
176. See supraPart I.B.
177. See supranotes 163-64 and accompanying text.
178. See supranotes 165-70 and accompanying text.
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Under this regime, intellectual property owners could petition the
U.S. Department of Justice to initiate law suits seeking relief-injunctions and damages-against states. A separate provision could
enable the intellectual property owner to recover any monetary
awards paid to the federal government. This procedure would obviously be cumbersome. It is unlikely, however, that it would be invoked with great frequency. In addition, it could be limited by allowing an appropriate federal official, such as the Director of the
Patent and Trademark Office, to decide whether to pursue a particular petition.
An alternative means of achieving this result could be through
the use of a qui tam regime. The qui tam model enables private individuals to vindicate the rights of the government. 179 It might be possible to reconceptualize private intellectual property rights to allow
for government vindication of those rights. One further step would
be to then allow private individuals to bring suits to vindicate such
rights on behalf of the federal government. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court is currently considering whether states
are persons under the False Claims Act and if so, whether
states have
80
Act.1
that
under
brought
suits
tam
immunity from qui
Remedial Legislation. The Supreme Court's Florida Prepaid
decision substantially raised the bar for congressional abrogation of
state sovereign immunity pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but it did not preclude this option entirely. Intellectual
property owners will need to adduce much more substantial evidence
of state infringement of federal intellectual property rights, both in
terms of the number of violations and the willfulness of the violations, in order to justify congressional abrogation of state sovereign
immunity,18 1 as well as evidence that state remedies are
179. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (authorizing private individual to bring a
civil action on the government's behalf to remedy false claims against the federal government).
180. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel.
Jonathan Stevens, 162 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted,119 S. Ct. 2391
(1999).
181. See FloridaPrepaid,119 S. Ct. at 2210 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997)) (suggesting that the legislative record would have to
establish "a history of 'widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional
rights' of the sort Congress had faced in enacting proper prophylactic § 5 leg-
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inadequate. 182 The Supreme Court did not establish a clear threshold
for when this burden is met, but it did suggest that evidence of intentional violations of federal intellectual property rights would be important in making the determination. 183 For the reasons discussed
above, 184 state infringement might never rise to the level necessary to
justify remedial legislation. And even if a pattern of patent infringement could be demonstrated, intellectual property owners
would also have to demonstrate that state remedies were inadequate.
Thus, in order for Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity,
intellectual property owners would have to establish, through monitoring and unsuccessful efforts to obtain remedies through state legal
and administrative processes, both a substantial pattern of state infringement and the lack of adequate state remedies. And even then,
Congress could only abrogate sovereign immunity
to the extent nec185
violation.
essary to remedy the constitutional
ConstitutionalAmendment. The clearest way to abrogate sovereign immunity for state infringement of federal intellectual property
rights would be through a constitutional amendment. This approach,
however, would face insuperable obstacles. In the entire history of
the United States, the complex process of amending the Constitution
has only been successfully used to override Supreme Court decisions
on four or five occasions. 186 It is unlikely that sufficient support
could be garnered to place this issue on the level of prior constitutional amendments. Even if two-thirds of the Congress were to support such a constitutional
amendment, it is doubtful that many states
87
it.'
ratify
to
would rush

islation").
182. See id. at 2207-08.
183. See id. at 2209 (noting that "a state actor's negligent act that causes
unintended injury to a person's property does not 'deprive' that person of
property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause").
184. See supra Part I.B.
185. See FloridaPrepaid,119 S. Ct. at 2210 (suggesting that Congress could
not abrogate sovereign immunity with regard to negligent infringement, nor of

states with adequate remedies or low incidence of infringement).
186. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 64-65 n. 10

(2d ed. 1988).
187. See U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring ratification of constitutional amendments by three-fourths of the states).
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The viability of these various approaches depends upon the extent of the problem, the salience of the issue, and the political
strength of the states in resisting such efforts. Intellectual property
owners can exert direct pressure upon legislators through lobbying
and campaign financing. They can also bring attention to the problems of state infringement by monitoring the behavior of state entities, bringing high-profile lawsuits, and waging public relations campaigns against states that do not respect federal intellectual property
rights. The efficacy of these efforts, however, will depend significantly upon the extent of the problem. If states and state entities do
not engage in widespread or otherwise significant acts of infringement, then the opportunity to catalyze the political process will be
modest. As the seriousness of the problem escalates, however, so
will the viability of more substantial political responses. In this way,
political constraints tighten as the magnitude of the problem rises.
In the most likely scenario, states will continue to respect federal
intellectual property rights and infringements of these rights by state
actors will be unintentional, episodic, and relatively rare. Where infringement occurs, the FloridaPrepaiddecisions present a challenge
and opportunity for intellectual property lawyers to test the efficacy
and limits of Exparte Young, § 1983, and takings actions in the federal courts. In addition, they will likely be able to pursue state inverse condemnation actions and possibly tort, state intellectual property, or contract claims, many of which are largely untested in most
of the states. In those areas in which states or state entities cross the
infringement line more systematically, the FloridaPrepaiddecisions
present challenges to business strategists to develop safeguards
against state infringement-whether through trade secrecy, technical
solutions (e.g., encryption, anti-circumvention technologies), and
new contracting approaches. Should states cavalierly infringe federal intellectual property rights, then intellectual property owners
will likely organize political campaigns at the state and federal levels
in order to combat abuses through a range of approaches including
direct involvement in state politics, waiver, and the use of contingencies in federal funding of programs and research. In addition, they
will seek (and already are seeking) creative federal legislative means
for filling the gap created by the FloridaPrepaiddecisions. And if
state infringement of federal intellectual property rights surpass the
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rather vague threshold suggested in FloridaPrepaid,188 Congress has
authority under the Fourteenth
Amendment to abrogate state sover189
directly.
eign immunity
In view of the multiplicity of institutional constraints upon state
infringement of federal intellectual property rights, the Florida Prepaid decisions are likely to have more of a symbolic than substantive
impact on state policies respecting intellectual property rights. Yet
in a few areas-such as the use of patented research methods in basic
research conducted at state universities-state institutions may toe
and possibly cross the line. Here, the narrow experimental use exception of the federal patent system may undermine innovation by
hindering basic research of the type that is the hallmark of university
research. 190 Although the increasingly commercial character of state
university research may alter this assessment, the effect of greater
leeway for universities to engage in basic research without concern
for patent licensing arguably will have an ambiguous or positive impact on progress in biomedical and other areas of scientific research.
This is not to say, however, that the Supreme Court's rulings in
the FloridaPrepaidcases do not impose real costs upon some intellectual property owners, complicate the enforcement of intellectual
property rights, and as a result undermine the promotion of science
and the useful arts. The uncertainty and cost of enforcing intellectual
property rights against states will discourage those with smaller
stakes from pursuing relief and will raise the costs for those seeking
relief. In addition, the constraints on enforcement will raise the costs
of contracting and monitoring transactions with state entities. Overall, however, the net effects of the FloridaPrepaiddecisions on the
incentives for creative activities are unlikely to be large and several
188. See FloridaPrepaid,119 S. Ct. at 2206-11.
189. A constitutional amendment abrogating state sovereign immunity with
respect to federal intellectual property infringement actions (or authorizing
Congress to abrogate such immunity) remains a last resort, but with daunting
odds. The U.S. Constitution is rarely amended, and this issue is neither pressing nor compelling to the states. It is difficult to imagine two-thirds of the
states consenting to reduce their sovereign immunity, particularly over an issue
such as this one.
190. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progressof Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017 (1989); Arti Kaur
Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the
Norms ofScience, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999).
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redundant systems for protecting intellectual property and selfcorrecting features of the intellectual property system will limit the
exposure of intellectual property owners to the gap opened up by the
FloridaPrepaiddecisions.
I.

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE FLORIDA PREPAID
DECISIONS

Although various institutional constraints will likely prevent or
at least substantially restrain states from infringing federal intellectual property rights in significant or pervasive ways, the Supreme
Court's Florida Prepaid decisions pose potential problems for the
United States in several international arenas. The rise of digital
technologies, advancements in transportation technologies, and reductions in trade barriers have dramatically increased international
trade flow. 191 Industries based upon new technologies and whose
value is derived significantly from intellectual property have spurred
American exports. American entertainment industries, software and
computer manufacturing companies, and pharmaceutical companies
derive substantial and growing proportions of their revenue streams
from their export operations and comprise a growing share of U.S.
exports. These products, however, are vulnerable to low cost duplication in countries lacking intellectual property protections or effective enforcement mechanisms. The concerns of intellectual property
owners with regard to international piracy has, over the past two decades, led the United States to pursue an increasingly more assertive
role in promoting the adoption of intellectual property protections
throughout the world, the harmonization of international protection
for intellectual property, and improvement of global institutions governing intellectual property rights. 192 The Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty, for which the
United States aggressively lobbied, established minimum criteria for
191. See Jerome H. Reichman, The TRIPs Component of the GATT's Uruguay Round: Competitive Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an
Integrated World Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171
(1993).

192. See RYAN, supra note 156, at chs. 4 & 7.
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intellectual property regimes. Furthermore, the United States has
forcefully objected to perceived weaknesses in the intellectual property laws of other nations. By opening a constitutional loophole of
debatable scope in the U.S. intellectual property regime, the Supreme
Court's recent decisions raise serious questions regarding U.S. compliance with international accords and undermine the credibility of
the United States in international intellectual property diplomacy.
A. Compliance with InternationalAccords
Over the past decade, the United States has actively built consensus for the establishment of new multilateral agreements for the
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. TRIPs
and NAFTA are particularly important in that they have relatively
strong and effective dispute resolution mechanisms. Unlike many
prior international agreements regarding intellectual property, these
newer agreements establish relatively clear minimum standards for
the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. The
FloridaPrepaid decisions, by striking down congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity from direct infringement actions in
federal courts, expose the United States to claims that it has failed to
comply with these international accords.
1. Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPs)
agreement'

93

United States trade diplomats used trade negotiations at the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), begun in 1986, to bring intellectual property protections
into trade negotiations. By linking tariff reductions on apparel and
agricultural goods with universal minimum standards of intellectual
property protection, developed nations were able194to persuade developing nations to accede to the TRIPs agreement.
193. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTSRESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPs Agreement].
194. See Michael E. Doane, TRIPS and InternationalIntellectual Property
Protection in an Age ofAdvancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
465 (1994). Articles 65 and 66 of the TRIPs agreement provide for a transi-
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Part II of the TRIPs agreement establishes minimum standards
concerning the availability, scope, and use of intellectual property
rights. It covers copyright and related rights, trademarks, industrial
designs, patents, and integrated circuit designs. Under each section,
the agreement limits the exceptions which member nations may enact. With regard to copyright and related rights, "Members shall
confine limitations or exceptions to the exclusive rights to certain
special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the
work and do not necessarily prejudice the legitimate interests of the
'
right holder."' 95
Similar provisions apply to trademarks196 and patents.197 Article
31 provides for a limited exception for government use without
authorization of the right holder: "[S]uch use may only be permitted
if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain
authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms
and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within
a reasonable time." 198 Article 31 allows members to dispense with
such efforts in circumstances of national emergency, exigency, or
cases of public noncommercial use. In all cases, however, the member state must notify the right holder as soon as "reasonably practicable."' 199 Article 31 further provides that "the right holder shall be
paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking
into account the economic value of the authorization." 200 The legal
validity of such authorization must be subject to judicial review.
Part HI of the TRIPs agreement provides for the enforcement of
intellectual property rights. Article 41 states that
1. Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as
specified in this Part are available under their law so as to
permit effective action against any act of infringement of
tional period for developing nations. Article 67 requires developed countries
to provide technical assistance to developing countries in the drafting of intellectual property laws and regulations.
195. TRIPs Agreement, supranote 193, art. 13.
196. See id. art. 17 (trademarks), art. 24 (applying to geographical indications).
197. See id. art. 30.
198. Id. art. 31.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and
remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringement. These procedures shall be applied in such a manner
as to avoid creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to
provide for safeguards against their abuse.
2. Procedures concerning the enforcement of intellectual
property rights shall be fair and equitable. They shall not
be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays .... 201
Article 41 further requires that members provide an opportunity for
judicial review. TRIPs also establishes minimum criteria for remedies. Article 44 requires that judicial officers have authority to order
injunctive relief (including desist orders).202 Article 45 requires that
1. The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order
the infringer to pay the right holder damages adequate to
compensate for the injury the right holder has suffered because of an infringement of that person's intellectual property right by an infringer who knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engaged in infringing activity.
2. The judicial authorities shall also have the authority to
order the infringer to pay the right holder expenses, which
may include appropriate attorney's fees .... 203
Article 46 requires that judicial authorities have the power to order
that infringing goods, materials, and implements used predominately
in the creation of infringing goods be seized and appropriately removed from commerce. 20 4 Article 61 requires members to apply
criminal procedures and penalties in the cases of wilful20 5trademark
counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale.
The World Trade Organization, which succeeds the GATT,
oversees implementation of the TRIPs agreement. Under the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding, members of TRIPs may initiate
proceedings against other members for failure to implement TRIPs
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. art. 41.
See id. art. 44.
Id. art. 45.
See id. art. 46.
See id. art. 61.
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requirements. 206 It is unclear whether a member may obtain a remedy against another member for a single breach of the obligation to
provide effective enforcement or only for systemic failures. 20 7 In
any case, immunity of states and state entities from infringement of
federal intellectual property rights would appear to qualify as a basis
for a remedy.
The United States could defend its system on the ground that
state officers may, under certain circumstances, be liable under the
Exparte Young doctrine for prospective injunctive relief and under §
1983 for damages. In addition, alternative remedies in state courts
may be available. It is questionable whether this hodge podge of
potential remedies would satisfy TRIPs's minimum criteria. Even
before the FloridaPrepaiddecisions, it is questionable whether the
United States fully adhered to Article 31 with regard to notification
of patent owners that their inventions were being used by government entities. 0 8 Following the FloridaPrepaiddecisions, enforcement of intellectual property rights against states would fall below
this Article 31 criteria. In addition, it is questionable whether states
would provide adequate or timely remedies for infringements.
TRIPs does not contain any exceptions based upon the distinctively American approach to state sovereignty and federalism. The
limitations on enforcement would appear to conflict with normal

206. See Frederick M. Abbott, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW AND THE GATT-WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 415 (E.U.
Petersmann ed., 1997).
207. Id.
208. The European Communities have noted that:
Under U.S. law (28 US Code Section 1498) a patent owner may not
enjoin or recover damages on the basis of his patents for infringements
due to the manufacture or use of goods by or for the US Government
Authorities. This practice is particularly frequent in the activities of
the [Department of Defense] but is also extremely widespread in practically all government departments. For obvious reasons this practice
is particularly detrimental to foreign right-holders because they will
generally not be able to detect governmental use and are thus very
likely to miss the opportunity to initiate the administrative claims procedure.
European Commission, Report on UnitedStates Barriersto Trade and Investment § 6.1 (1997).
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exploitation of intellectual property works and would prejudice the
legitimate interests of the right holder.
Member states of international accords do not typically proceed
against other member states on the basis of each and every perceived
inconsistency or violation of international agreements. Nations resolve to examine a broad range of foreign trade and other diplomatic
considerations in deciding whether and how to pursue the enforcement of international law provisions. To put this in perspective, after
an exhaustive review, the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) has concluded that no foreign nation satisfies all of the
minimum criteria set forth in the TRIPs agreement. 20 9 Yet the more
vulnerable the United States is to claims of noncompliance, the
greater its exposure to enforcement actions and the more difficulty it
will face in seeking trade and other concessions from other nations.
2. The North American Free Trade Agreement
As part of its multifaceted strategy to strengthen intellectual
property rights throughout the world, the United States pushed for
the inclusion of intellectual property protections in its regional trade
agreement with Canada and Mexico. NAFTA provides that "Each
party shall provide in its territory to the nationals of another Party
adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights, while ensuring that measures to enforce intellectual
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate
trade." 210 Article 1714 states that "each Party shall ensure that enforcement procedures ... are available under its domestic law so as
to permit effective action to be taken against any act of infringement
of intellectual property rights, . . . including expeditious remedies to
prevent infringements and remedies to deter further infringements. ' 2 1 Each member state is to "ensure that its procedures for
the enforcement of intellectual property rights are fair and equitable,
are not unnecessarily complicated or costly, and do not entail

209. See USTR Fact Sheets on Super 301 Trade LiberalizationPrioritiesand
Special 301 on Intellectual Property, 6 INT'L TRADE RPTR. (BNA) 715, 719

(1989).
210. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, U.S.-Can.Mex., art. 1701, 32 I.L.M. 289, at § 1 [hereinafter NAFTA].
211. Id. art. 174.
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unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays. 212 NAFTA allows
parties to provide "limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking
into account the legitimate interests of other persons. 21 3
The NAFTA language largely tracks the TRIPs provisions. A
signatory's authority to make exceptions are similarly limited.
NAFTA focuses more narrowly upon the protection of intellectual
property rights of foreign nationals and not the integrity of the overall intellectual property regime. Canada and Mexico would be able
to challenge the United States regime to the extent that states and
state entities are beyond the effective and timely reach of foreign intellectual property owners.
3. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty
The United States also played a substantial role in the development of the WIPO Copyright Treaty which, like TRIPs and NAFTA,
required signatory nations to establish minimum criteria for the protection of intellectual property works. In addition to reaffirming
parties' adherence to the Beme Convention, the WIPO Copyright
Treaty obligates signatories "to provide adequate legal protection
against the circumvention of effective technological measures that
are used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights
under this Treaty or the Berne Convention ..... , 214 Article 12 obligates contracting parties to "provide adequate and effective legal
remedies against any person knowingly performing" acts which they
212. Id.
213. Id. art. 1709, § 6. NAFTA has similar limitations on exceptions for

copyright, see id. art. 1705, § 5 ("Each Party shall confine limitations or exceptions to the rights provided for in this Article to certain special cases that do
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder."); sound recordings, see
id. art. 1706, § 3 (same as copyright); and trademarks, see id. art. 1708, § 12
("A Party may provide limited exceptions to the rights conferred by a trade-

mark, such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided that such exceptions take
into account the legitimate interests of the trademark owner and of other persons.").
214. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S.

at 10 (1997).

TREATY

Doc. No. 105-17,

June 2000]

ECONOMICIMPLICATIONS

1455

have reason to know will "induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an infringement of any right covered by this treaty or the Berne Convention."2 15 The United 216
States amended its copyright law in 1998 to
implement this treaty.
The only exception within the WIPO Copyright Treaty is rather
narrow:
Contracting Parties may, in their national legislation, provide for limitations of or exceptions to the rights granted to
authors of literary and artistic works under this Treaty in
certain special cases that do no conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably
prejudice
217
author.
the
of
interests
legitimate
the
As with TRIPs and NAFTA, the exception here would not justify
immunity for states and state entities. The principal defense would
have to be that alternative legal and administrative remedies are substantially equivalent to direct infringement actions under the Copyright Act.
B. IntellectualPropertyDiplomacy
In response to mounting trade deficits, Congress enacted the
Trade Act of 1974,218 which revised the Trade Expansion Act of
1962 to allow the President to restrict imports from countries that
had unreasonably restricted U.S. exports. Section 301 authorizes the
President to retaliate against foreign countries for engaging in "unfair" trade practices, even if such practices had not been found to
contravene international law. 219 The United States used this
215. Id. at 11.
216. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1999)).
217. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 215, art. 10(1).
218. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 301-306, 88 Stat. 1978
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (1994)).
219. Section 301 authorizes domestic industries to petition the U.S. Trade
Representative to investigate allegations of unfair trade practices limiting U.S.
exports. In addition, the USTR may initiate its own investigations. After investigation and consultation with relevant foreign country representatives, the
USTR determines whether United States trade agreement rights have been
violated or whether the foreign country has engaged in unfair trade practices.
The Trade Act requires that remedies be implemented if trade rights are denied
or if unjustifiable trade practices are found. The Trade Act allows the USTR
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unilateral power in bilateral interactions to pressure foreign nations
and as part of a concerted effort
to adopt more liberal trade practices
2 20
agreements.
to achieve multilateral
By the early 1980s, American businesses relying heavily upon
intellectual property rights mobilized their forces to focus U.S. trade
policy on piracy of intellectual property abroad. 1 In 1984, Congress amended the Trade Act to expressly authorize retaliation
against nations failing to protect and enforce intellectual property
rights.222 Congress further strengthened the hand of U.S. trade negotiators through the passage of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.223 In a set of provisions that have come to be
known as "Special 301,,,224 Congress directed the USTR to develop
an annual list of "priority" countries that "have the most onerous or
egregious acts, policies, or practices that (i) deny adequate and effective intellectual property rights, or (ii) deny fair and equitable
market access to United States persons that rely upon intellectual
property protection."2 25 The USTR must investigate these nations'
practices and may take action. If the investigation reveals that the
priority list country has denied U.S. rights and has not made progress
in remedying these problems within eighteen months of the initiation
of the 6investigation, then the President must pursue responsive ac22
tion.

discretion to recommend remedies where it finds unreasonable or discriminatory trade practices.
220. See Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third
World: Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 CAN. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1989).

221. See RYAN, supra note 156, at 167-72.
222. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 295 (1979);
Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 304, 306, 98 Stat. 3002 (1984). The 1984 Act also expanded the scope of the Trade Act to include services.
223. Pub. L. No. 100-48, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended in various
sections of 19 U.S.C.).

224. See Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "Special 301 ": Its Requirements, Implementation, and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259 (198990); Brian Mark Berliner, Making Intellectual Property Pirates Walk the
Plank: Using "Special 301 " to Protect the United States' Rights, 12 LOY. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 725 (1990).

225. 19 U.S.C. §2242(b)(1)(A) (1999).
226. See id. §§ 2411(a), 2414(a).
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The USTR has implemented Special 301 law with particular
zeal. Its priority list documents in significant detail a tremendous
number of impediments to the protection of intellectual property
rights of U.S. domestic industries in foreign nations.227 Substantially
228
The USTR has
every trading partner comes under scrutiny.
opened more than one hundred investigations, many in the past decade focusing on allegations that trading partners deny adequate and
effective intellectual property rights.
Two prominent efforts by the USTR to push for stronger intellectual property rights in foreign countries illustrate the ways in
which the Florida Prepaid decisions could potentially undermine
U.S. credibility in foreign trade and intellectual property diplomacy.
The first involves a protracted dispute with the People's Republic of
China focusing on piracy of copyrighted works. The second, of
more recent vintage, involves a new South Africa law providing the
Minister of Health with discretion in expanding the dissemination of
pharmaceutical products.
The USTR listed China on its 1989 Special 301 priority list
based on complaints by the International Intellectual Property Alliance and others that China tolerated widespread piracy of copyrighted books, films, music, and software. 22 9 Numerous factories in
southern China were producing millions of compact and laser discs
U.S. copyright owners alleged
for distribution throughout Asia.
that the government was actively involved in pirating intellectual
property through government corruption. 231 The USTR instituted a
formal Section 301 investigation in 1991 and has been actively enin China's intellectual property regaged in efforts to address2 gaps
32
1990s.
the
throughout
gime

227. See U.S. Trade Representative, 1999 National Trade Estimate (visited
Mar. 26, 2000) <http://www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/1999>.
228. See U.S. Trade Representative, Section 301 Table of Cases (last modified Aug. 9, 1999) <http://www.ustr.gov/reports/301report/act30 1.htm>.
229. See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, TRADE
LOSSES DUE TO PIRACY AND OTHER MARKET ACCESS BARRIERS AFFECTING
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES 57-66 (Apr. 1989).
230. See RYAN, supranote 156, at 80.

231. See id. at81.
232. See id. at 81-84.
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The perception that states and state entities within the United
States have immunity from infringement liability for violation of intellectual property rights could provide China and other centrally
planned economies with a simple and rhetorically effective response
to U.S. efforts to close down pirate factories abroad. These countries
could merely mimic U.S. law. As discussed in Part I, federal and
state law provide numerous avenues of legal recourse against infringement of federal intellectual property rights by states and state
entities. Furthermore, it is unlikely that states will engage in systematic infringement of federal intellectual property rights. These realities, however, do not necessarily carry the day in the rough and tumble world of international trade politics. China or other centrally
planned economies could emulate state sovereignty and provide
cumbersome and largely ineffective state remedies, all the while
claiming they have the same substantive law as the United States. In
the end, diplomacy efforts depend on a broad range of factors. Yet
erosion of legal and moral high ground does not enhance the effectiveness of U.S. trade negotiators.
A recent trade intellectual property dispute with South Africa
further illustrates the way in which state sovereign immunity interacts with trade relations. In an effort to respond to an AIDS epidemic affecting a substantial proportion of its population, 233 South
Africa amended its Medicines and Related Substances Control Act in
1997 to authorize the Minister of Health to order compulsory licensing and parallel importation of pharmaceuticals.2 34 The pharmaceutical industry considered the vague and open-ended authority of this
law to be a serious threat to the protection of intellectual property
rights.2 35 The United States called on the South African government
to "bring its IPR [intellectual property rights] regime into full compliance with TRIPS before the January 1, 2000 deadline . ..and
233. See Hanging on to the Profits from AIDS; Sufferers in Africa Are
Threatened by Sanctions Against Cheap Drugs, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 5,
1999, at 18; Minister Predicts Six Million South Africans with HIV (visited
<http://www.cnn.com/world/africa/9908/25/bc-AIDSJune
5,
2000)
SAFRICA.reut>.
234. See Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of
1997, 3 JSRSA § 1 (1998).
235. See Claire Bisseker, CheaperMedicine at a Price * Health Policy, FIN.
MAIL (S. AFR.), Oct. 17, 1997, at 36.
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clarify that the powers granted in the Medicines Act are consistent
with its international obligations and will not be used to weaken or
abrogate pharmaceutical patent protection., 236 Yet under a regime of
state sovereign immunity, pharmaceutical companies could not bring
direct patent infringement actions against state hospitals that pirated
patented drugs. As explained in Part I, such a policy or action is unlikely to be adopted, and if it were to be pursued, various avenues of
legal recourse remain available to patent holders to enjoin such action and seek recompense. Nonetheless, the fact remains that it
would not be through a direct infringement action and would encounter substantial procedural and substantive obstacles to expeditious, full, and fair relief. As a result, South Africa and other nations
that adopt more lax intellectual property policies may be able to
counter U.S. diplomacy to tighten their intellectual property regimes.
The argument can be made that United States intellectual property trade diplomacy often reflects a narrow view of intellectual
property issues shaped principally by the interests of U.S. intellectual
property owners. 237 While it may well be the case that special interests have had disproportionate influence in setting the U.S. diplomatic agenda, the solution to that problem lies in improving campaign finance, ethics in government, limits on post-government
lobbying, and related laws designed to ensure balanced and objective
representation and discourage capture of government decisionmaking processes. It should not be through undermining the effectiveness of foreign diplomacy. The issue raised by state sovereign
immunity from liability for infringement of intellectual property
rights relates principally to whether the United States should have a
unified and effective voice in its foreign relations activities. The
236. See Helaine Klasky, USTR Announces Results of Special 301 Annual
Review, (visited Apr. 30, 1999) <http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1999/O4/9941.html>; see also United States Department of State, U.S. Government Efforts
to Negotiate the Repeal, Termination or Withdrawal of Article 15(c) of the
South African Medicines and Related Substances Act of 1997 (visited Jan. 21,
2000) <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/stdept-feb51999.html>.
237. See Pamela Samuelson, The DigitalAgenda of the World Intellectual
Property Organization:PrincipalPaper: The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO,
37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369 (1997); RYAN, supra note 156; October 6, 1999 letter to
CharleneBarshefsky regardingreview of U.S. tradepolicy as it relates to ac1,
2000)
drugs
(visited
Apr.
cess
to
essential
<http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/country/cb-oct6-99.html>.
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Florida Prepaid decisions undermine such authority by potentially
putting beyond the reach of the federal government the ability to implement a fair and effective system of intellectual property protection
and enforcement. This problem will become more acute as intellectual property becomes an increasingly international issue. As the
China and South Africa examples illustrate, state sovereign immunity represents a potentially enormous loophole in the development
of a truly global system of protection for intellectual property. Thus,
the Supreme Court's opening of a state immunity gap within the federal intellectual property enforcement scheme may have significant
adverse long-term effects on the climate for innovation in the United
States by undermining the federal government's credibility in intellectual property diplomacy efforts.
C. InternationalTreaty Obligations and ForeignRelations as Bases
for CongressionalAbrogation of State Sovereign Immunityfor
Infringement ofFederalIntellectualPropertyRights
These threats to international diplomacy provide an alternative
basis within established constitutional principles on which to justify
congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity for infringement of federal intellectual property rights. The Necessary and
Proper Clause of the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to enact
legislation implementing foreign treaties ratified by the United
States.238 Because state sovereignty has never been understood to
extend to international affairs,239 the Eleventh Amendment would not
238. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416, 432 (1920); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 121-22 (1901); Martin
S. Flaherty, Are We to be a Nation?: FederalPower vs. "States' Rights" in
ForeignAffairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1278 (1999); Thomas Healy, Note, Is
Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalism and the Treaty Power, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 1726 (1998); cf Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958)
(noting that although the Constitution does not expressly grant Congress
authority to regulate foreign affairs, "there can be no doubt of the existence of
this power in the law-making organ of the Nation"); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (stating that the powers of
the United States to conduct foreign affairs do not derive from the Constitution, but are inherent from the sovereignty of the nation).
239. See Ioannou v. New York, 371 U.S. 30, 31 (1962) ("The Constitution
by Art. I, § 10, imposes severe limitations on the several States' power to affect the foreign relations of the United States.").
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appear to limit this aspect of Congress's Article I powers. 240 Therefore, Congress could plausibly justify a re-enactment of the intellectual property remedy clarification acts as implementing U.S. treaty
obligations
under TRIPs, NAFTA, and the WIPO Copyright
1
Treaty.

24

Although NAFTA and TRIPs were approved as CongressionalExecutive Agreements 242 (requiring simple majorities of both

240. It could be argued that the Supreme Court's decision in FloridaPrepaid
holds that Congress lacks authority under Article I to abrogate state sovereign
immunity. The Court states that
In Seminole Tribe, of course, this Court overruled the plurality in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 109 (1989), our only prior
case finding congressional authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity to an Article I power (the Commerce Clause). 517 U.S., at 7273. Seminole Tribe makes clear that Congress may not abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers; hence the Patent
Remedy Act cannot be sustained under either the Commerce Clause or
the Patent Clause. Id.
119 S. Ct. at 2205. This language is merely restating Seminole Tribe, which
did not distinguish among the differences among Article I clauses with respect
to state sovereignty. States possessed sovereignty with regard to domestic affairs (as would be relevant to the Commerce Clause and the Patent Clause), but
not foreign affairs. These powers have always resided at the national level.
Therefore, it would not be appropriate to read FloridaPrepaid as precluding
Congress from abrogating the States' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity under its treaty or foreign relation powers. Cf Zschemig v. Miller, 389
U.S. 429 (1968) (striking down, under the Supremacy Clause on the basis of
foreign relations considerations, an Oregon statute that would have denied inheritance to East German heirs because the recipients could not establish that
East Germany provided reciprocal inheritance rights for Americans and would
not confiscate foreign heirs' rights to the proceeds of the Oregon bequest);
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, No. 99-474, 2000 WL 775550
(June 19, 2000) (striking down, under the Supremacy Clause on the basis of
foreign relations considerations, a Massachusetts statute prohibiting state entities from doing business with U.S. or foreign companies doing business with
Myanmar (which the legislation refers to as Burma)).
241. Professor Gerald Neuman has argued that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, struck down in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997), could be similarly resuscitated by re-enactment on the grounds that it
implements U.S. treaty obligations under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA,
14 CONST. COMMENTARY 33,49-54 (1997).

242. See NAFTA Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057
(1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3311 (1994)); Uruguay Round Agreements
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Houses) and not through formal treaty ratification (requiring assent
by two-thirds of the Senate),243 the Supreme Court has recognized
that the federal government may regulate foreign affairs independent
of its treaty powers 244 and that Congressional-Executive Agreements
Such Congressional-Executive
pass constitutional muster. 245
Agreements have been widely used as an alternative to formal treaties during the past 60 years, 246 particularly in trade-related matters. 247

Even though Congress did not incorporate the terms of

NAFTA and TRJPs directly into federal law, 248 these agreements are
Furthermore, the federal
binding under international law.249
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3511
(1994)).
243. See U.S. CONST., Art. IX,§ 2.
244. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958); United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
245. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (stating that
international agreements, like treaties, are to be given supremacy over state
law); Curtiss-Wright,299 U.S. at 318; Made in the USA Foundation v. United
States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (upholding constitutionality of
NAFTA). See generally Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REv. 801 (1995) (arguing that CongressionalExecutive Agreements are valid). But see Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and
Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-FormMethod in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1221 (1995) (questioning the constitutionality of
Congressional-Executive Agreements in some circumstances); David M.
Golove, Against Free-form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791 (1998) (responding to Tribe's analysis).
246. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 245, at 802-03; Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential
Agreements: InterchangeableInstruments of National Policy: I, 54 YALE L.J.
181 (1945); Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and CongresionalExecutive or PresidentialAgreements: Interchangeable Instruments of NationalPolicy: II, 54 YALE L.J. 534 (1945).
247. See LouIs HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

218 (1996).
248. Both implementing statutes express that no state law or its application
may be declared invalid on the ground that the provision is inconsistent with
the international agreement, except in an action brought for such purpose by
the United States. See NAFTA Implementation Act, § 102(b)(2), 107 Stat. at
2063; Uruguay Round Agreements Act, § 102(b)(2)(A), 108 Stat. at 4817.
249. See John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement UnderstandingMisunderstandingson the Nature ofLegal Obligations,91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60,
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government possesses authority under its foreign affairs power to
override state law in order to effectuate these international agreements.
The reliance upon international treaty obligations and exclusive
federal foreign relations powers as a basis for overriding state sovereign immunity for infringement of federal intellectual property rights
finds support in the increasing globalization of markets for goods and
services built upon intellectual property rights. It is essential for
many companies to develop international if not global intellectual
property right portfolios. Copyright protection is already global,250
and the Patent Cooperation Treaty 251 as well as improvements in international patent institutions 25z have moved the world toward a
more unified system. The Internet is rapidly expanding the international exchange of intellectual property and increasing the signifi25 3
cance of and conflict over patent, copyright, and trademark rights.
The ease with which copyrighted and patented works can be disstrong
seminated and infringed over the Internet support the need 2for
54
federal authority in governing intellectual property policies.
61 (1997) (noting that a U.S. court is "bound to utilize international law obligations in its interpretation of national law"); see also The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating that "international law is part of our law, and
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented
for their determination").
250. The Berne Convention, which has been ratified by many of the world's
nations, eliminates copyright formalities for foreign authors. See Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 99-27 art.5.
251. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645 (1970) (ratified in the U.S. 1975).
252. See generally ARPAD BOGSCH, THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE
PATENT COOPERATION TREATY: 1970-1995 (1995); RYAN, supra note 151, at
128-32.
253. See Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territorialityand Infringement on Global Computer Networks, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1993); MARK A.
LEMLEY ET AL., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW (2000).

254. The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), a coalition representing U.S. copyright-based industries, monitors and reports on the extent of

piracy of copyrighted works throughout the world. IIPA estimates international piracy losses to U.S. copyright-based industries in 1995 of $18 to $20
billion. See Letter from Eric H. Smith, president of IIPA, to Joseph Papovich,
Acting Assistant USTR for Services Investment and Intellectual Property (vis-
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Much of the phenomenal growth of the United States economy
over the past decade has been attributable to new information technologies. 255 Exports having significant intellectual property content
now account for over twenty-five percent of the U.S. total, a significant rise over any prior period in U.S. history.256 The information
technology sector of the U.S. economy has steadily increased its
share of the gross domestic product throughout the 1990s and shows
no sign of slowing down. These patterns can be seen throughout the
global economy. 257 This vital sector of the United States economy
has benefited directly from the expansion of intellectual property
rights throughout the world. In order to sustain this growth, it is increasingly important that the United States both comply with international law and maintain the credibility to pressure other nations to
do the same. These developments bolster the importance for the
United States of fostering uniform minimum standards for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights throughout the
world. Congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity for infringement of federal intellectual property rights directly supports
adherence to U.S. treaty obligations and the pursuit of foreign relations goals.
IL. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon25 8 that Congress must "mak[e] its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute" to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity set in motion a chain of judicial actions and
legislative reactions. Applying this standard, several appellate

ited Feb. 16, 2000) <http://www.iipa.com/html/rbispecial_301_lttr_
22096.html>; see also R. MICHAEL GADBAW & TIMOTHY J. RICHARDS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT?

3 (1988) (estimating piracy of U.S. intellectual property rights of $25 billion
per year in the mid-to late-1980s).
255. See U.S. COMMERCE DEPARTMENT, THE EMERGING
ECONOMY 11 (1999).
256. See GADBAW & RICHARDS, supranote 254, at 4.
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257. See The Importance of Being American: U.S. Dominance in the Computer Software Industry: A Survey of the Software Industry, ECONOMIST, May

25, 1996, at S14.
258. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
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courts 259 ruled that Congress had not evinced such an intent in the
federal copyright and patent laws and therefore dismissed infringement actions against states or state entities. Although there was relatively little evidence that states or state entities had systematically or
even significantly infringed federal intellectual property rights, Congress enacted the intellectual property remedy clarification acts to
protect against that risk and to promote a uniform federal intellectual
property system.
However, in a parallel constitutional law development, the Supreme Court narrowed the circumstances under which Congress
could abrogate state sovereign immunity. 260 Therefore, when the
validity of two of the intellectual property remedy clarification acts
came up for review last year, the Supreme Court raised the bar
against direct enforcement of state infringement of federal intellectual property in federal courts quite a bit higher. Since that time, the
Fifth Circuit has struck down the third of the remedy clarification
acts. These decisions, while of some symbolic significance, are not
likely to change state policies respecting federal intellectual property
rights. The FloridaPrepaiddecisions may somewhat alter the bargaining dynamic of states and intellectual property owners in a few
areas such as public university research, but a broad array of legal,
market, social, and political constraints will likely discourage states
and state actors from becoming intellectual property pirates.
Perhaps the greatest risks of the FloridaPrepaiddecisions lie in
their implications for the further development of a strong and enforceable international intellectual property regime. The United
States has aggressively lobbied international institutions and other
nations to adopt strong and comprehensive intellectual property laws.
This policy has enhanced the revenues of United States intellectual
property owners by enabling them to better protect and enforce their
intellectual property rights abroad. By opening a conspicuous gap in
the U.S. intellectual property scheme based on a distinctively
259. See Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 810 (1990); Lane v. First Nat'l Bank, 871 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1989);
BV Eng'g v. UCLA, 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1090 (1989); Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir.
1988), cert.denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989).
260. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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American justification, the Supreme Court's Florida Prepaiddecisions jeopardize this progress. State sovereign immunity from the
enforcement of federal intellectual property rights arguably violates
U.S. obligations under the TRIPs, NAFTA, and WIPO Copyright
Treaty agreements. Moreover, the United States has threatened and
imposed trade sanctions against other nations for gaps in their domestic intellectual property regimes that, at least in their literal terms,
are less open-ended than immunity in national courts for intellectual
property violations by states and state entities.
Although state sovereign immunity for violations of federal intellectual property rights is likely to be of only symbolic and not substantive importance in the United States, such subtleties are easily
overlooked in the international sphere. The fact that the Supreme
Court ruled that Congress lacks authority under the U.S. Constitution
to abrogate this immunity fuels the potential for mischaracterization
and exaggeration of this gap in international diplomacy circles. In
nations in which states and state enterprises play a more direct role in
the economy, this type of gap in the intellectual property system
could subvert the interests of intellectual property owners. Accordingly, the credibility of the United States in preventing and combating international intellectual property piracy could suffer as a result
of the Florida Prepaid decisions. To the extent that the United
States is hindered or delayed in achieving its goal of universal protection and effective enforcement of intellectual property rights,
United States intellectual property owners will suffer a significant
loss in their revenue stream, which, in turn, will reduce the incentives
for engaging in creative enterprise. These international concerns
provide an alternative basis for congressional abrogation of state
sovereign immunity for infringement of federal intellectual property
rights.

